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**THE CIVILIAN RESPONSE CORPS: HARNESSING THE
POLITICAL WILL TO BUILD A TRUE CIVILIAN CAPACITY**

by

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Preface

The topic of this paper, the Civilian Response Corps, was not chosen by happenstance. It was upon receiving notification of my follow-on assignment at the conclusion of Air Command and Staff College that my interest in the topic became piqued. In July 2009, I will join the ranks of the “expeditionary diplomats” who make up this unique, upstart organization and take diplomacy to the field. My research proved insightful to the challenges I will face in my new position. More so, however, it excited me about the future, not just my own, but of the United States and the role our nation will play in providing a safer, more secure world for all people. While many challenges remain, the creation of the CRC is a sign that our nation is moving toward a truly joint effort in tackling our future security questions. It will take all the instruments of national power to achieve our objectives. I am looking forward to becoming a part, however small, of this honorable and important mission.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank those who assisted me in the drafting of this research: Dr. Bert Frandsen, for his guidance, encouragement, and, in particular, his flexibility in allowing me to follow my heart; John McNamara and John Mongan of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, for taking time out of their busy schedules to talk to me about the office, its issues, and its challenges; Mrs. Susan Siefert, for her editorial guidance and expertise; LCDR Tracy Green, for his candor and encouragement; and, finally, James Webb, my husband, for his patience and insight. I am grateful to you all.

Abstract

In 2004, in response to the dismal reconstruction situation in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created, with the State Department tasked to take the lead. However, the creation of S/CRS included little or no funding for the office or its mission. Gaps in staffing, a lack of training, and the absence of support rendered the first years of this fledgling organization difficult and trying. Support for the organization, at least in rhetoric, spans the range of politics and government. From the White House to the Congress to the interagency community, political and government leaders are speaking out in support of S/CRS and its mission.

The future of this organization remains in questions. Although the S/CRS has made progress and won small victories, huge challenges must be met before it and its expeditionary component, the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), can become the organization envisioned by its founders. S/CRS has the potential to meet some of the most important challenges the US will face in the years to come. However, it will require transforming the political speeches into actionable direction and support before S/CRS will reach its full potential. With the new Administration's mantra of diplomacy first and Congress' newly allocated funds for S/CRS, the time is right to seize this opportunity and build this organization so that the US can initiate a new era of coordination and cooperation in the area that truly wins a war--as opposed to a battle--stability and reconstruction operations.

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INTRODUCTION

We view defense, diplomacy, and development as the three pillars of American foreign policy. That's not rhetoric. That is our commitment. That's how we are proceeding.

Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton, January 2009¹

Political change at the highest levels of the United States government is the impetus for necessary transformation after many years of suspicion, stove piping, and competition for resources in a landscape defined by an America at war. This opportunity would have arisen with the change of government, no matter which party had taken control of the White House. The political environment in Washington, particularly among the various agencies and departments within the Executive Branch, is ripe to rectify the perceived wrongs of the past and set a new tone of cooperation, synergy, and harmonization of effort. The players at the working levels have been begging for such an opportunity, and the time for it is now. The territorial ownership of policies and procedures of the last administration can be set aside without worrying about the feelings and reactions of the political appointees whose dictates and decisions led to the current situation. With this clean slate comes a new beginning. The future begins now, and achieving that future requires setting aside petty squabbles and turf battles for the good of the Nation. Though muddied by the economic crisis facing the world, the atmosphere within the “Beltway” is permeated with anticipation and optimism. This atmosphere is sure to wane in a short time as the newness wears off, so it is essential that the necessary changes be executed swiftly and purposefully. Now is the time to lay the groundwork for

the future of a whole-government approach to the Nation's policies and objectives, both domestic and abroad.

Nowhere is this change more needed than in the coordination efforts pertaining to reconstruction and stabilization operations. During 2004, in response to the dismal results of the reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created, and the State Department was tasked to take the lead on the interagency effort. However, the creation of S/CRS included little or no funding for the office or its mission. In fact, funds were eventually allotted to the Department of Defense (DoD) and then channeled to S/CRS to provide enough funding to begin office startup. This lack of funding, as well as a lack of trust within the interagency community resulting from the lack of inclusiveness during the planning and initial stages of the war in Iraq, left the S/CRS drifting in a sea of bureaucracy, apathy, and outright hostility during its first years. Gaps in staffing, a lack of training, and the absence of support from the Beltway community (both inside and outside of the Executive Branch) rendered the first years of this fledgling organization difficult and trying. Although the S/CRS has made progress and won small victories, huge challenges must be met before it and its expeditionary component, the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), can become the organization envisioned by its founders. With the new Administration's mantra of diplomacy first and Congress' newly allocated funds for S/CRS, the time is right to seize this opportunity and build this organization so that the United States can initiate a new era of coordination and cooperation in the area that truly wins a war--as opposed to a battle--stability and reconstruction operations.

HISTORY OF S/CRS

We must also improve the responsiveness of our government to help nations emerging from tyranny and war... [O]ur government must be able to move quickly and provide needed assistance.

President George W. Bush, 18 May 2005

In April 2004, under the direction of the National Security Council (NCS), the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established at the State Department to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-major conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”² The timing of the creation of this office was not happenstance. Just over a year had passed since US Forces had entered Iraq, the United States had just announced the appointment of a new Ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, and the plan was underway to reopen the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad for the first time since 1991. Things were not going as well as initially planned on the ground in Iraq. An insurgency had reared its ugly head and, in April 2004, the US military fought the First Battle of Fallujah in an effort to quash the growing insurgency. Many experts attributed this growing insurgency to the lack of basic services and reconstruction in Iraq in the aftermath of the initial phase of the war. Little to no planning had been done regarding who and where reconstruction efforts would take place and the efforts underway were primarily military or contractor led. The apparent lack of coordination among the different agencies and the unstable security situation prevented many US developmental components from leaving or moving outside

the “green zone” to begin the necessary reconstruction projects within Iraq. Personnel shortages among the civilian agencies were dire. The State Department had only a handful of personnel in country at that time. Iraqi reconstruction was the talk around town in Washington’s political circles, and a new office to coordinate these efforts seemed just the thing to quiet the buzz.

The concept of a coordinated effort among agencies to deal with reconstruction and stabilization efforts was not new. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) had operated in Vietnam, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established in Afghanistan and Iraq. These efforts, however, were primarily driven by the officers and staff on site in a particular location and had inherent challenges. CORDS is considered, by many, to have been a success, although it was never able to make up for “the flawed execution of pacification plans and programs [by the South Vietnamese government], the ubiquitous corruption, and the failure of the South Vietnamese government to build a broad, self-sustaining political base.”³ It did, however, provide a centralized mechanism for coordination of all pacification effort, ensuring unity of effort and sufficient resources.⁴ The initial PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq were less centralized—almost ad hoc—in their efforts. They tended to draw upon the specific skills of the personnel assigned to them and tailor their efforts likewise, as opposed to pursuing a specific mission or following a set of objectives. They suffered from leadership and organizational problems as well. There were no “agreed objectives, delineation of authority and responsibility between the civilian and military personnel plans, or job descriptions.”⁵

It was in this context of history and current day strife that S/CRS was launched with little fanfare, a handful of personnel, and no budget. Generally, the idea of a coordinating body for reconstruction efforts was well received, but skepticism and suspicion remained both inside and outside of the government. Spokespersons continually underscored that the office was not created as a response to the situation on the ground in Iraq, but was part of a longer-term vision of the US National Security Strategy. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher, responding to a question regarding whether the office was created as a response to the DoD's experience in Iraq, stated, "That's not the case. It was created because time after time we find ourselves dealing with failed states, transitional governments, new situations, things that, to the extent that we can, we should anticipate."⁶ Some critics saw the creation of this office as yet more evidence of what they called then-President Bush's doctrine of anticipatory war, "a government devoted to perpetual preemptive deconstruction now has a standing office of perpetual preemptive reconstruction."⁷ This suspicion was echoed in the hallways of many agencies within the executive branch as well, particularly after the Administration's adamant proclamations earlier that the US does not engage in "nation building."⁸ Many questions were raised about the role of this fledgling office, how it would be staffed, and its source of funding.

The first few years of S/CRS proved challenging in all of these areas. As the office began to come together, resources were tight in both the personnel and budget areas, while selling the idea of S/CRS became the focus of the office. The first Special Coordinator, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, engaged in a circuit ride around Washington, introducing and explaining S/CRS to the Hill, to other agencies, and to the press. He

gave speeches to think tanks, held press briefings, and met with the heads of the other agencies that were to participate in or work alongside S/CRS in planning and fieldwork. He found an extremely receptive audience at the DoD, where many had begun to lament the fact that the military was now taking on reconstruction roles traditionally viewed as civilian responsibilities. After the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” (Appendix A) on December 7, 2005, the DoD began incorporating S/CRS into policy guidance and doctrine. NSPD-44 directed the Secretaries of State and Defense to “integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.”⁹ Senior DoD officials took the S/CRS cause and embraced it, lobbying Congress on behalf of the State Department and facilitating funding to be transferred from DoD to S/CRS for office set up and initial operations.

However well the S/CRS was received by the powerful DoD, the money only trickled in. Congress approved an initial infusion of \$7.7 million in the FY05 Supplemental budget for the new office, and these funds were used primarily for initial set up costs and coordination of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Sudan.¹⁰ Budget requests, typically in the \$75 to \$250 million range, fell on deaf ears over the next three years, with only minimal earmarks making it through Congress and into the S/CRS coffers. In fact, the financial situation for S/CRS was so dismal, its very existence was threatened. Recognizing the severity of the situation, Defense Secretary Robert Gates testified before Congress on behalf of the State Department and further arranged to have \$200 million reallocated from DoD to S/CRS.¹¹ So, as funding lagged, the growth and shape of the office atrophied in response.

Conflict Response Fund¹²

Foreign Ops Appropriations	Administration Request	House	Senate	Final
FY 2005	\$100 million	\$0	\$20 million	\$0
FY 2006	\$100 million	\$0*	\$24 million	\$0
FY 2007	\$75 million	\$0	incomplete	\$0
	\$0	\$50 million**	\$50 million***	
	\$25 million			

* The House FY06 foreign operations appropriations bill authorized the transfer of up to \$100 million among DoS accounts to carry out reconstruction and stabilization assistance. The final bill did not include transfer authority.

** The House Appropriations Committee included \$50 million in the FY07 supplemental to establish and maintain a civilian reserve corps.

*** The Senate adopted an amendment offered by Senator Lugar (IN) to make \$50 million available to support and maintain a civilian reserve corps.

One of the best indicators of this lag was the slow growth of the S/CRS staff. .

When the office first came into being, staffing guidelines called for an interagency Washington-based staff of approximately 75 personnel and a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) of 100 personnel from a variety of applicable agencies ready to deploy to regions on a 48-hour call-out notice. Budget shortfalls, however, meant a smaller staff and a diminished ability to respond to crisis. By mid-2005, a staff of 35, drawn from State, USAID, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs, Joint Forces Command, Corps of Engineers, Treasury, and Intelligence community, worked at the newly formed S/CRS, all detailed to the office in non-reimbursable positions.¹³ The implications of non-reimbursable details are significant; there is no guarantee that the funding from the home agency of the individual filling the position will be renewed each subsequent year. It leaves the office and the person filling the position in limbo, unsure whether they will have a job or an office during the next fiscal year.

Staffing and budget challenges aside, S/CRS proved its worth and viability during several small-scale efforts in the first years. While members of S/CRS have contributed to the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq since their inception, they have also taken the lead on interagency coordination of other efforts in every region of the world. For example, a team from the Active Response Corps (ARC) of the CRC was the first semi-permanent official presence in the Darfur region of Sudan beginning in 2005 and provided reporting and coordination on the ground. One of their primary missions was the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and planning for the interagency integrated support to the region. In 2006, S/CRS responded by deploying two members, one ARC and one Standby, to Chad to monitor the displacement of civilians and civil unrest overflowing from neighboring Sudan.¹⁴ S/CRS was also integral to the planning for, and eventual implementation of, the US Haiti Stabilization Initiative in 2007, an interagency mission focusing on one of the most destabilizing neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince. This mission focused on reestablishing a police presence in the neighborhood, while at the same time, focusing on development and public works projects in concert with the Government of Haiti.¹⁵ S/CRS was also the coordinating element of the mission to develop a coordinated “whole of government” strategy for the first four years after Kosovo declared its independence in 2007.¹⁶ Most recently, during the summer of 2008, S/CRS was instrumental in providing coordination for the US response to the outbreak of hostilities in Georgia. These examples show the early successes and utility of S/CRS, not only in locations where the U.S. is engaged in combat, but around the world, in some of the more remote and less obvious places.

POLITICAL WILL

I will increase both the numbers and capabilities of our diplomats, development experts, and other civilians who can work alongside our military. We can't just say there is no military solution to these problems. We need to integrate all aspects of American might.

Barack Obama, Washington, D.C. August 1, 2007¹⁷

With its nascence in the Bush Administration, lack of funding, and skeleton staff, the future of S/CRS seems to be in question. Will this organization founded by the “old regime” be cast off before it has the chance to prove its worth? On the basis of much of the rhetoric emanating from the new Administration on the campaign trail and during their first days in office, as well as that coming from other agencies within the executive branch and Congress, the answer is seemingly no. In fact, one of the cornerstones of President Obama’s foreign policy and defense platforms during his campaign for the presidency strongly suggested a robust S/CRS and large CRC. As outlined in his campaign material focusing on a “Military for the 21st Century,” (Appendix B) the then-candidate stated these priorities:

Confronting the security challenges of the 21st century requires not just defeating armed enemies, but becoming a force for stability and opportunity throughout the world. One of the best ways to support the brave men and women in our armed forces is to address the great imbalance in our executive branch capacity for dealing with 21st-century challenges that aren’t of a purely military nature. While many of these policies are detailed in Obama’s foreign policy initiatives, some demand inclusion in Obama’s vision of national defense. An Obama administration will:

- **Establish an Expeditionary Capability:** within non-Pentagon agencies (State Department, US Agency for International Development, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, etc.) to deploy personnel where they are needed. These civilians will be integrated with, and sometimes operate independently from, our military expeditionary capabilities. This will help move troops out of civilian roles, as well as bring in the experts with the right expertise and skills.
- **Create a Civilian Assistance Corps (CAC):** There is presently no mechanism for civilians with special skill-sets (be they doctors, lawyers, engineers, city

planners, agriculture specialists, police, etc.) and a sense of service, to be trained and organized to help their nation when it needs them. The Civilian Assistance Corps (modeled after similar auxiliary groups in Virginia and California) would provide each federal agency a pool of volunteer experts willing to deploy in crises. They would be pre-trained and screened for deployment to supplement departments' expeditionary teams. The creation of such a corps would ensure that true experts carry out tasks such as restoring electricity or creating banking systems, rather than the current practice of expecting already over-burdened soldiers to assume these roles. An Obama administration will set a goal of creating a national CAC of 25,000 personnel.¹⁸

Obama continued to campaign on these concepts throughout the eighteen months leading up to the election. In a major foreign policy speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, (Appendix C) he again spoke about an entity strongly resembling the proposed structure of the CRC when he proposed, "...new Mobile Development Teams that bring together personnel from the State Department, the Pentagon, and USAID. These teams will work with civil society and local governments to make an immediate impact in peoples' lives, and to turn the tide against extremism."¹⁹ Whether it is called expeditionary diplomacy, Civilian Assistance Corps, Mobile Development Team, or Civilian Response Corps, the idea is the same: a mobile force of wide-ranging civilian capabilities that can deploy quickly and provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance wherever needed throughout the world. It seems that the CRC is on the new President's radar, and he sees its growth as a priority to achieving his foreign policy objectives.

This support for the civilian coordination for reconstruction and stabilization does not stop at the top. The new Vice President has long been a supporter of the idea. When he was minority leader of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he felt so strongly about this concept that in 2004, he co-authored, along with the Republican Committee

Chair, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act, better known in Congress as the Lugar-Biden Bill. Along with organizing, equipping, and training personnel for reconstruction and stabilization efforts, this bill “...would create a Rapid Response Corps that is able to respond to both emerging threats and emerging opportunities.”²⁰ As a Senator, Vice President Biden was well known in Washington to be a strong advocate for US Foreign Policy, the State Department, and the Foreign Service. It is expected that this trend will continue now that he has assumed the role of Obama’s number two.

In his appointment of Senator Hilary Rodham Clinton, previously his opponent in the race for the White House, to the position of Secretary of State, President Obama demonstrated a firm commitment to the priority diplomacy that the Department of State will play in his Administration. A well-known name and figure in world politics, Secretary Clinton made it clear from day one that she planned to bring more resources and sway to the US diplomatic corps. During her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Appendix D), she emphasized that more attention should be paid to the diplomatic instrument of national power, both in the traditional sense and in the more recent ideas of reconstruction and stabilization. “We've got to get our arms around what you could think of as traditional foreign aid -- health, education, economic empowerment and the like -- plus what is now becoming increasingly important -- that's reconstruction, stability, conflict resolution, peacekeeping challenges that we face.”²¹ In addition, she provided a written response to the new Committee Chair, Senator John Kerry, to a query about S/CRS in which she said she “looked forward to enhancing its capacity.”²² While words and rhetoric make excellent news bites, until the resources are

available, this new emphasis and focus on diplomacy will be just that – words and rhetoric. The fight for resources will be a difficult one, particularly in these difficult economic times, and it will take the full commitment of the newly minted Secretary of State to argue that case before her former colleagues in Congress.

Although Congressional support for the office and its mission were minimal during the first years of the S/CRS, the support seems to be increasing. The Lugar-Biden bill first went before the 108th Congress in 2004, but never made it out of committee for vote. During the 109th Congress, Senator Lugar once again introduced the bill. It received unanimous approval in the Senate, but died before reaching the House floor for a vote. During the next session of Congress, the bill was first introduced to the House by Representative Sam Farr, and passed unanimously. It then proceeded to Senate committee, where it remained throughout the regular session. It seemed that the bill would again die at the end of the session, but Senator Carl Levin rolled the principle elements of the bill into Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 (Appendix E). This supplemental bill encountered no significant resistance in either the Senate or the House, and President Bush signed it into law on October 14, 2008. Title XVI, also known as The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008, codifies the role of the State Department as the lead organization in reconstruction and stabilization efforts and gives Congressional authorization for the establishment of a Readiness Response Corps and a Civilian Reserve Component under the auspices of S/CRS. While this codification of S/CRS' role is important, Congress took an even more important step for the office in the summer of 2008 when it approved the first substantial infusion of money into the organization. In

the 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Congress authorized \$75 million for S/CRS.²³ Though it was well below the \$350 million requested, it was the first “real” money the organization received since its inception. When the proposed FY09 Federal Budget was released by the White House in March 2008, it contained a provision allocating \$249 million for a Civilian Stabilization Initiative providing funding for S/CRS and the establishment of the full spectrum of the CRC. However, after all the controversy surrounding the financial bailout bill in the first weeks of the new Congress, the FY09 budget was scaled back significantly, including the allocations for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. When the budget finally passed the House on February 26, 2009, as the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Congress allocated S/CRS \$75 million, far short of the originally requested \$249 million.²⁴ This funding, however, is adequate to establish a 250-member Active Response Corps and train 2000 Standby Component members. This allocation and the 2008 supplemental funding indicate a firm commitment on the part of Congress to the creation of a viable, sustainable Civilian Response Corps. Thus, in 2008 and 2009, Congress finally demonstrated its commitment to S/CRS and its mission by codifying it in law and providing it with its own (meager) resources.

From the White House to Capitol Hill, politicians from both sides of the aisle are calling for an increase in the civilian capacity to provide stabilization and reconstruction support in an organized, coordinated fashion. It is obvious the political will to grow this capacity is there. One of the real tests of this political determination, however, will be whether it can stand up to the pressures of the domestic agenda during this economic crisis. The economic demands of a financial sector in crisis and two on-going wars will

truly test the intentions of the politicians and quickly show whether their words were just talk or truly a call to action.

STATE-DEFENSE COOPERATION

The next step therefore, is to design an enduring division of labor between State and Defense for the management of stabilization and reconstruction missions, a division that both Departments buy into, that both the Congress and the Administration support, and that both Republicans and Democrats will be content to work within, no matter which controls the White House or the Capitol.²⁵

James Dobbins, Director, RAND Corp.

While the political will of elected and appointed officials is important to S/CRS, even more vital to the survival of this new organization is its relationship with its partner agencies within the executive branch. Much has been written about the challenges and turf wars associated with interagency coordination. In fact, some have gone so far as to call for a new “Goldwaters-Nichols Act” to institutionalize the interagency process.²⁶ If this article had been written in 2004, at the birth of S/CRS, it would have focused primarily on improving the cooperation and coordination between the Departments of State and Defense. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq and subsequent fallout, many said the relationship between the two agencies had never been worse. Political commentators divined that Secretary Powell’s resignation as Secretary of State at the end of 2004 was directly attributable to his clashes with Secretary Rumsfeld over the war in Iraq.²⁷ People were asking how things could have gotten so bad in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, clearly, Powell and the State Department were the Administration’s scapegoat.²⁸ Five years later, however, the story is quite different.

The leadership of the DoD, both civilian and military, has made improving relations and cooperation between the two organizations a priority over the last five years. They have incorporated State Department policies and guidance into their Professional Military Education curriculum and joint doctrine, while the number of military officers serving in professional exchanges at the State Department increased dramatically. At the State Department, the changes have been less formal, but are quite apparent all the same. State Department officers have begun to attend military staff colleges, rather than just the higher level War Colleges, which has allowed for interaction of mid-level military and Foreign Service officers earlier in their careers and at the operational level. The number of Political Advisors (POLADs) to Military Commanders has also increased and parallels a growth in the Political-Military Bureau that had shrunk dramatically in the post-cold war years. This interaction has been more than just symbolic. State officers have been invited to participate in joint training exercises and military officers have begun to attend training at the Foreign Service Institute. This cooperation has been genuine, and it will lead to increased coordination in the planning, training, and deployment of US forces, both military and civilian.

The incorporation of coordination with the State Department and, in particular, S/CRS into military policy guidance, doctrine, and training exercises indicates the strong desire of the military to work with its interagency partners in the realm of reconstruction and stabilization. As the war in Iraq transitioned from a conventional war to a counterinsurgency, one of the most common complaints from soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines concerned the reconstruction responsibilities and tasks thrust upon them on the ground. As one Army Reserve officer said, “What we're doing now is never

something we expected to do. We figured we'd provide some emergency assistance and then we'd be out of here.”²⁹ Although these dedicated military men and women stepped up to the plate and took on these daunting roles with little or no training, many of them wondered where the civilians trained to do this type of work were and why there seemed to be no plan. Thus the introduction of S/CRS in 2004 came as a welcomed relief to many in the military. The concept of the organization was rapidly included into joint doctrine, the military “bible” for operational planning. By the end of 2008, five Joint Publications, most notably JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, as well as DoD Directive 3000.5, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” had reference to S/CRS as a fully functioning component to be included in military planning. Unfortunately, S/CRS looked better on paper than in reality.³⁰ Presidential directives and NSC guidance empowered S/CRS in many ways, but the lack of resources meant an extremely limited capacity to implement the reality of these responsibilities, particularly in comparison with the well-funded and robust Pentagon.

Many in the Pentagon recognized these limitations and began to work with the small S/CRS, providing military personnel on non-reimbursable details, offering guidance on planning, incorporating the organization into joint training exercises (such as Multi-National Exercise 4), and even working with Congress to ensure \$200 million in emergency funding would be available to the organization in the event it was needed, via DoD Section 1207 funds.³¹ Military officers, historically frustrated with what they saw as a lack of transparency and delineation in the State Department planning process,³² were pleased when State, DoD, and some 30 other federal agencies formed working groups to develop a planning system that would provide an interagency framework that

was clear and understandable to civilians and military alike. The result of this collaboration is the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization, a three-tiered system which “addresses strategic, operational and tactical levels of engagement for highly complex crises that are national security priorities, where multiple US Government agencies are involved, and that might require military operations. The system is specifically designed to integrate civilian and military planning and operations at all levels.”³³ Although some issues persist – some personality, some bureaucratic – between the Departments of State and Defense, the recent years of tension, misunderstanding, and suspicion eclipsed as civilian and military personnel worked together to create a synergistic platform for future operations at every level.

One of the most interesting developments in this new atmosphere of DoD-State cooperation is the emergence of DoD senior leadership as a voice and advocate for State Department resources. Particularly since the appointment of Robert Gates as Donald Rumsfeld’s successor as Secretary of Defense, DoD officials have been testifying before Congress, speaking to the media, and asserting to Non-Governmental Organizations about the importance of funding for, and the role of, the State Department in achieving our foreign policy objectives. In fact, during a speech at Kansas State University in November 2007, Gates asserted, “What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security - diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.”³⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, echoed Gates’ comments when he said, “We must leverage every single aspect of national power – soft and hard...it requires a comprehensive approach, from diplomacy, to foreign

assistance and aid, to building partnership capacity, to building partners.”³⁵ Nowhere is this more apparent than in the arena of stability and reconstruction operations. Time and time again, senior Pentagon leadership can be heard advocating on behalf of the development community and S/CRS. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2005, advocated that “establishing S/CRS is a critical first step to transforming the way the USG responds to stabilization and reconstruction missions around the world.”³⁶ And these sentiments can be heard all the way down the chain of command to the troops in the field, who have been doing reconstruction missions in place of the limited capabilities of S/CRS. Suddenly, the greatest advocates for the State Department, in mission scope, funding, and resources, are from the Defense Department. Now, these two organizations, which seemed diametrically opposed just five years earlier, are suddenly fused together by the quagmire that initially drove them apart.

CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD

I think it's important to understand that the ability to organize all elements of American power is essential not just to deal with the lingering problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, but to deal with the national security challenges we are going to face for the next one or, more likely, two generations.

Ambassador John Herbst, Coordinator, S/CRS

Recognizing that the political will is there and that interagency coordination is improving and harmonizing every day, what are the significant challenges for developing S/CRS into the organization everyone wants and talks about? The answer is simple: **resources**, both financial and human; a **complete force**, consisting of active, standby,

and reserve components; and **legislation**, providing protections for the force and its personnel. These three elements are the greatest barriers to S/CRS' ability to achieve marked progress and planning for a whole of government approach to reconstruction and stability operations.

The struggle for resources is well documented throughout the short history of S/CRS. Funding has been sparse and personnel difficult to attract and retain. Even those “work around” mechanisms that have been identified and utilized have inherent disadvantages. The Section 1207 mechanism allowed the DoD to transfer \$100 million of its funds per year for stabilization and reconstruction efforts. This transfer did perpetuate the office in the very lean first years and funded operations in more than ten countries between 2006 and 2008.³⁷ However, as some critics have noted, transfer of these funds requires the Secretary of Defense to sign off on the individual programs and operations they will fund. This “work around” has made the Secretary of Defense the de facto last word on the locations of stability and reconstruction operations, as opposed to the Secretary of State as directed in NSPD-44. Another “work around,” non-reimbursable details of personnel from other agencies, has provided a mechanism to staff S/CRS by allowing the other agencies and bureaus to fund these positions. However, as one member of the S/CRS staff asserted, “It is like living paycheck to paycheck.” There is no guarantee that the position or the funding will be there the next year, which makes future planning difficult for the office and leaves the person in the position concerned about their own future. These “work arounds” were necessary to perpetuate S/CRS over the first five years of its existence. The recent allocations in the FY09 Omnibus Appropriations will allow for the office to exert some financial control. **However, it is**

imperative that Congress continue to approve and increase funding to the requested levels for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative so that the office can establish a complete force and make operational decisions free of interference from outside agencies.

With the proper funding available, S/CRS could begin the daunting task of assembling all three elements of a well-rounded Civilian Response Corps. A small Active Component (a 30-member interagency team known as the Active Response Corps) is already in operation, and already has plans to expand its numbers with the funding from the Omnibus Appropriations. The Standby Component exists and several officers have deployed with ARC team members, though not in the numbers or availability needed. For now, the Reserve Component is purely theoretical. The challenges of funding and organizing this element of the CRC have made it impossible to move forward with this vital initiative at the core of the concept of the CRC.

The Active Response Corps (CRC-A) are full-time government employees whose job is to train, plan, and deploy to perform stability and reconstruction operations throughout the world. They are available to deploy to an operation within 48 hours, and once on the ground, they will be responsible for staffing and manning the reconstruction/stability/conflict prevention operation. They will focus on critical initial interagency functions of the mission including “assessment, planning, management, administrative, logistical, and resource mobilization.”³⁸ The team currently numbers approximately 30 individuals from varying agencies, but with the recent funding, the team will be expanded to 250. The ARC team is composed of three different types of personnel: Foreign Service Officers, S/CRS Civil Servants, and Civil Servants from the

Interagency Community (such as USAID, Justice, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security). Each of these groups has its own challenges and issues that must be addressed for the ARC team to be truly viable.

The Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) on the ARC team are career employees and commissioned officers of the Department of State. In their careers, these “career diplomats” change positions every one to three years and spend approximately 60-70% of their careers overseas serving in US embassies and consulates. They have increasing levels of responsibility, as they move up the ranks in a merit-based promotion system similar to that of the military. Unlike civil servants, whose ranks are determined by the positions they encumber, FSOs carry their rank with them and can be assigned to positions that may be intended for someone of a higher (or occasionally lower) rank. As a result of this competitive merit based promotion system, many FSOs are attracted to those positions, which are viewed as making them more competitive before promotion boards. Although no statistical evidence is available, the reputation of positions in S/CRS is that they do not help FSOs increase their “promotability.” **The Director General of the Foreign Service should make it a priority to highlight the successes of previous ARC team members in terms of promotion to encourage recruiting for S/CRS and improve the reputation of the organization among mid-level officers.**

Directly related to the “promotability” factor is the lack of applicability of the ARC team position to any of the five functional career tracks of FSOs. Generalist FSOs (as opposed to Specialists who work specifically within their designated specialty, i.e., Information Management, Security, Healthcare, Office Management) belong to one of five functional career tracks: Consular, Political, Economic, Management, and Public

Diplomacy. Because the ARC team role is so wide and varying, it does not clearly fall into one of these five tracks and is therefore designated as “interfunctional.” During an FSO’s career, it is expected that they may serve in a few assignments outside of their career track; however, to remain competitive among their peers, the bulk of their career will be spent in positions within their designated career track. Increasingly, as new dimensions are added to the diplomatic mission of the Foreign Service, more and more positions do not line up with the traditional career tracks. **This issue should be analyzed and studied by the State Department Bureau of Human Resources and the adoption of a new Generalist career track should be considered.** The new “National Security” career track would encompass many of these hard-to-define new positions, including ARC team, PRTs, POLADs, Narcotics Affairs, and Political-Military Officers, and would allow for a natural career progression for officers taking on the less traditional roles of diplomacy.³⁹

This new career path would also eliminate another challenge facing S/CRS regarding FSOs – encouraging officers to return to the office for another tour later in their career. The goal of the ARC team management is to provide approximately six months of training to new team members before declaring them “deployable.”⁴⁰ It was only in February 2009, with the availability of additional funding, that the length of tours for ARC team members extended from one year to two years. Six months of training is a serious investment in time and resources into an officer who will have only 18 months to apply this knowledge. While recruiting for the mid-level FS-03 ARC team members has not been problematic for S/CRS, finding experienced FS-02 officers to serve as Team Leaders or FS-01 and Senior Foreign Service Officers to serve as office directors within

S/CRS is a continuing challenge.⁴¹ Spending another two or three years in a position away from the designated career track, particularly for more senior officers, is not seen as career enhancing. If these officers were in a career track dedicated to this new component of diplomacy, National Security, it would encourage these seasoned and trained officers to return to positions of leadership within S/CRS, provide a dedicated corps of officers, and offer a better return on the time and resources expended on their initial training.

The non-FSO, Civil Servant members of the ARC team have their own unique challenges. General Schedule (GS) positions with the Federal government are permanent in nature and without a natural career progression or promotion mechanism built into these positions. As the common jibe goes, “You stay in the same GS job until you die or retire, or the guy above you dies or retires.” The nature of the work of an ARC team member, however, is not conducive to the permanency of the typical GS position. The constant deployment and the strenuous nature of the duties cannot be endured for the duration of a typical civil service career. It cannot be expected that an employee can endure a working lifetime, constantly deployed to some of the most difficult and dangerous places of the world, without a serious burnout problem. Thus, a mechanism that provides civil service employees with opportunities to take a break and perform other functions or jobs must be intrinsic to these positions. **The Office of Personnel Management and the State Department Bureau of Human Resources must identify methods whereby civil servant members of the ARC team can temporarily rotate to another position, while also providing a temporary replacement for that position.** **This should include the possibility of educational rotations to private, civilian, and**

military educational institutions, exchanges with other departments and agencies, and the use of Presidential Management Interns to fill in staffing gaps during these temporary absences.

The work of the ARC team is interagency by its very nature and the inclusion of team members from agencies such as USAID, Treasury, Agriculture, Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, and Health and Human Services is vital to achieving the mission. However, these agencies face similar challenges to the State Department in resource restraints and personnel shortages. These agencies (with the exception of USAID) have mission sets that are primarily domestic in nature. The international components of these agencies are typically very small and already stretched thin. Giving up these highly trained and knowledgeable personnel for a two-year tour on the ARC team is a sacrifice that some of these agencies do not have the resources to make. **Congress must ensure that all relevant agencies are adequately funded to perform their core missions, and the Human Resources divisions at these agencies must seek out new and innovative ways to realign and release willing staff to engage in this important national security function.**

Equally essential to the mission of stability and reconstruction operations is the Standby Component (CRC-S) of the CRC. These are full-time federal government employees from the entire interagency community with specialized skills applicable to reconstruction and stabilization efforts and who are on a standby roster, trained and available to deploy within 30 days. The current plan is to train approximately 2000 such standbys with a wide range of skills and abilities.⁴² While a significant number of officers from a variety of agencies have expressed interest in participating in the Standby

Component, and many have signed up, the difficulty arises in getting these individuals released from their “real jobs” to participate in training or operations. There is a “myth that there is some fat around that can be pulled,”⁴³ But this belief is not, however, the reality. With Foreign Service staffing dipping below 70% in most locations – in embassies overseas and even more drastically in domestic offices – management simply cannot afford to release their precious staff to another mission. The situation is no better at other agencies in the Federal government. Staffing is stretched thin and priority is on the domestic portions of their agenda. To solve this dilemma, **Congress must provide the necessary financial resources to these agencies to ensure these staffing gaps are filled and some flexibility can be built into the system. In addition, the leadership of these agencies must make it clear to supervisors and managers that the mission of S/CRS is a priority and Standby Component members must be released for service when needed.**

One of the unique aspects of the CRC is the Reserve Component (CRC-R), though funding for this component is not yet approved. This aspect is private citizens who volunteer to be available for deployment to a reconstruction and stabilization operation within 45-60 days as temporary employees of the Federal government. They will have skills, expertise, and numbers that cannot be matched by the regular federal workforce. These “members would be drawn from the private sector and state and local governments across the United States, with expertise in the range of processes necessary in a transition from crisis including: policing and rule of law, infrastructure development, economic stabilization, state and local governance, agriculture, and provision of basic services.”⁴⁴ Like the Armed Forces Reserve, these individuals will be driven by a sense

of public service and will bring a wide range of skills, cultivated in the private sector, to the CRC. Unlike the Armed Forces Reserve, however, no legislation provides for the reemployment rights of these valiant volunteers. The Veterans' lobby is extremely protective of these rights provided by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) and the business community complains that too many reservists are already deployed. To provide this essential element of the CRC organization, **Congress must approve the funding request to organize these citizen volunteers and, more importantly, provide legislation similar to the USERRA that will provide for the protection of their livelihood after they return from serving as the face of their nation overseas.**

Finally, traditional diplomacy cannot be sacrificed for expeditionary diplomacy. The two must work hand in hand. While stabilization and reconstruction are occurring in one nation, the diplomatic work of ensuring partnerships and regional commitment must be occurring in neighboring nations. Achieving this work will take not only a whole of government approach from the United States, but a regional, multinational approach to ensure success in the long run. It is the long-term diplomatic commitment to a nation that ensures that the work of stability and reconstruction continues for future generations and cements the relationship between that country and the United States. Thus, while resources and funding for the CRC are essential to achieving the mission of reconstruction and stabilization, without a properly funded and resourced State Department, the work of the CRC is sure to fail in the long run. **Congress must approve a robust budget for the State Department to fill staffing gaps and expand diplomatic outreach throughout the world in both expeditionary and traditional manners.**

CONCLUSION

Where people are most vulnerable, where the light of hope has grown dark, and where we are in a position to make a real difference in advancing security and opportunity – that is where these teams will go.

Barack Obama, 1 August 2007

Much has been said by officials from the Defense Department, the State Department, Congress, and the new White House about the importance of a civilian capacity for stability and reconstruction operations. The value of this organization in “The Long War” cannot be discounted, for when the fighting slows or stops, there must be a mechanism to help lift up the people and help them begin to rebuild. History has shown that without this assistance, a new, stronger enemy will emerge and once again draw our troops into battle. Reconstruction and stabilization operations are the key to winning the hearts and minds of the people, and it is only through the people that the war can truly be won.

If the new President is to follow through on his campaign platforms, the funding, development, and expansion of S/CRS and the CRC should be a top foreign affairs priority. He must put aside the organization’s history and linkages to the previous administration and commit to grow and build the organization he envisions, making it his own. As President Obama begins to think about the foreign policy legacy of his Presidency, perhaps the answer is already at his feet – The Civilian Response Corps. If properly funded, developed, and utilized, the CRC could be for Obama what the Peace Corps was to Kennedy: the right tool, at the right time, formed from the most abundant resource in the United States – the experience, pride, and goodwill of the American people.

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

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¹⁷ Obama, "A 21st Century Military for America."

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¹⁹ Obama, Foreign Relations Speech, 1 August 2007.

²⁰ Biden, "Nations on the Brink."

²¹ Clinton, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 2009.

²² Clinton, Response to Questions for the Record from Senator John Kerry.

²³ HR 2642. Supplemental Appropriations Act 2009. US House of Representatives.

²⁴ HR 1105, Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, US House of Representatives.

²⁵ Dobbins, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 3 March 2004.

²⁶ Gorman, "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the US Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process."

²⁷ Allen, "Powell Announces His Resignation."

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²⁹ Chandrasekaran, "Inexperienced Hands Guide Iraq Rebuilding."

³⁰ Interview with S/CRS Director for Planning, John McNamara, 3 February 2009.

³¹ H.R. 1815, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006, Section 1207, Security and Stabilization Assistance which states that "The Secretary of Defense may provide services to, and transfer defense articles and funds to, the Secretary of State for the purposes of facilitating the provision by the Secretary of State of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country."

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³³ Beik, "Developing the United States Government's Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization: A Work in Progress," 2.

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³⁹ Finney, "Integrating National Security Strategy at the Operational Level: The Role of State Department Political Advisors," 398.

⁴⁰ Interview with John Mongan, Director, Active Response Corps, S/CRS, 5 February 2009.

⁴¹ Ibid.

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APPENDIX A

National Security Presidential Directive 44

7007

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 7, 2005

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND COUNSEL TO THE
PRESIDENT
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning
Reconstruction and Stabilization +

Introduction

The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.

Policy

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and

market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

Responsibilities of the Department of State

Need for Coordinated U.S. Efforts. To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.

Coordination. The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.

To achieve the objectives of this directive, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the following functions and may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization ("Coordinator") to assist the Secretary to:

- (1) Develop and approve strategies, with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, for reconstruction and stabilization activities directed towards foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife;
- (2) Ensure program and policy coordination among Departments and Agencies of the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, and other relevant assistance laws, as well as section 408 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and related Agencies and Appropriations Act, 2005, with respect to such states;
- (3) Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts for those states and regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate;
- (4) Provide United States Government decision makers with detailed options for an integrated United States Government response in connection with specific reconstruction and stabilization operations including to recommend when to establish a limited-time PCC-level group to focus on a country or region facing major reconstruction and stabilization challenges;
- (5) Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases; develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine;
- (6) Coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities and preventative strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities with capabilities that can contribute to such efforts provided that the Secretary of the Treasury shall lead coordination with the international financial institutions and multilateral financing bodies and shall facilitate the Secretary of State's stabilization and reconstruction work with respect to these institutions and bodies;
- (7) As appropriate, work with people and organizations, including in expatriate and foreign communities, with relevant ties, expertise, or knowledge related to countries

in which the United States may conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities;

- (8) Develop strategies to build partnership security capacity abroad and seek to maximize nongovernmental and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization activities;
- (9) Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities; analyze, formulate, and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities to respond quickly and effectively;
- (10) Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations;
- (11) Resolve relevant policy, program, and funding disputes among United States Government Departments and Agencies with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, related to reconstruction and stabilization consistent with the Office of Management and Budget's budgetary and policy coordination functions; and
- (12) When necessary, identify appropriate issues for resolution or action through the NSC interagency process in accordance with NSPD-1. Such issues would include the establishment of a PCC-level group as described in sub-paragraph (4) above.

Responsibilities of Other Executive Departments and Agencies

To enable the Secretary of State to carry out the responsibilities in this directive and to support stabilization and reconstruction activities and requirements with necessary resources, Executive Departments and Agencies whose programs and personnel may be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges will:

- (1) Coordinate with S/CRS during budget formulation for relevant reconstruction and stabilization activities prior to submission to OMB and the Congress or as required to coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities;
- (2) Identify, develop, and provide the Coordinator with relevant information on capabilities and assets;
- (3) Identify and develop internal capabilities for planning and for resource and program management that can be mobilized in response to crises;
- (4) Identify within each agency current and former civilian employees skilled in crisis response, including employees employed by contract, and establish under each agency's authorities mechanisms to reassign or reemploy skilled

personnel (including by contract) and mobilize associated resources rapidly in response to crises;

- (5) Assist in identifying situations of concern, developing action and contingency plans, responding to crises that occur, assessing lessons learned, and undertaking other efforts and initiatives to ensure a coordinated U.S. response and effective international reconstruction and stabilization efforts;
- (6) Designate appropriate senior United States Government officials and government experts as points of contact to participate in relevant task forces, planning processes, gaming exercises, training, after action reviews, and other essential tasks; and
- (7) Make available personnel on a non-reimbursable basis, as appropriate and feasible, to work as part of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and develop plans for additional personnel exchanges, as appropriate, across departments and agencies to increase interoperability for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Coordination between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.

Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be re-designated as transitions are required.

Policy Coordination Committee

I hereby establish a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The PCC will be chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a designated member of the NSC staff. The PCC shall include representatives in accordance with NSPD-1.

Nothing in this directive shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals. In addition, this Directive is not intended to, and does not: (1) affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces of the United States; (2) affect the DNI's and D/CIA's authorities under title 50 of US Code; (3) affect the authority of the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance under Section 493 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; and, (4) create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, entities, instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

This directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 56, May 20, 1997, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations."

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George W. Bush".

APPENDIX B
Obama Campaign Military Platform

Paid for by Obama for America

A 21ST CENTURY MILITARY FOR AMERICA

Before the 2000 election, George Bush and Dick Cheney famously told our military “Help is on the way.” Today, the active Army is short 3,000 captains and majors, and 58 percent of recent West Point graduates are choosing to leave the force – double the historic average. We do not have a single combat brigade at home in reserve, ready for an unexpected crisis. Our National Guard and Reserves have only half the equipment levels they need, hampering their ability to respond to crises, foreign and domestic. Ending the war in Iraq will be the beginning, but not the end, of addressing our defense challenges. Terrorist networks with a global reach and aspirations to weapons of mass destruction threaten our security. Failing states half a world away can provide safe harbor for terrorists and destabilize entire regions. Extreme regimes, like Iran and North Korea, threaten their neighbors, proliferate nuclear technology, and support terrorists while rising powers like China hold the potential to be either partners or adversaries. And most importantly, nations around the globe are reluctant to join with America in taking on mutual threats because they question our own commitment to democracy, justice, peace, and opportunity.

The defense policies detailed here represent one aspect of Barack Obama’s comprehensive, rigorous approach to advancing American national security and foreign policy. His initiatives on diplomacy and development (detailed in separate fact sheet available on barackobama.com) combined with his defense policies will create a stronger America and a safer world. America simply cannot afford more of the old approach to our national defense. Instead, we need a commander in chief with the right combination of judgment, vision, and leadership for the new century’s challenges. We must have a 21st century military recruited, trained, organized, and equipped to succeed in the new security environment. To achieve this, we need a new administration with a 21st century vision—an Obama administration, determined to face our global challenges and dedicated to supporting the selfless and brave armed forces serving our nation.

As our next president, Barack Obama will:

- End the war in Iraq
- Reestablish the proper leadership role of the commander in chief for the 21st century
- Place ‘people first,’ so our military can recruit and retain the forces it needs and our servicemembers and their families are treated with the respect and appreciation they deserve
- Rebuild our National Guard and Reserves, to be better prepared to respond at home and abroad
- Focus on adapting and building U.S. military capabilities for current, not Cold War, needs
- Restore our global partnerships, to leverage the capabilities of others and win the ‘war of ideas’
- Build civilian capacity to promote stability and tackle security challenges with a ‘whole of government’ approach, so that our troops are not alone in the fight

- Place our troops before CEOs, reigning in military outsourcing and restoring honesty, openness, and economic good sense to our defense contracting and budgeting processes.

1) Ending the war in Iraq

“I will remove one or two brigades a month, and get all of our combat troops out of Iraq within 16 months. The only troops I will keep in Iraq will perform the limited missions of protecting our diplomats and carrying out targeted strikes on al Qaeda. And I will launch the diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives that are so badly needed. Let there be no doubt: I will end this war.” – Barack Obama, Chicago, October 2, 2007

The war in Iraq has put a severe strain on our armed forces and set back our security. The first priority for Barack Obama when he is elected President will be ending the war in Iraq.

Obama Plan to End the War: Barack Obama will immediately give his military commanders a new mission in Iraq: ending the war. He will immediately begin to remove our combat brigades from Iraq. He will remove troops at a pace of 1 to 2 brigades a month, and have all of our combat brigades out of Iraq within 16 months.

And he will maintain a force in Iraq or the region with two tightly focused missions: guarding our embassy and diplomats, and targeting al Qaeda inside Iraq. During our drawdown, Obama will launch aggressive initiatives to press for reconciliation within Iraq, to achieve a new regional compact on stability in Iraq and the Middle East, and to address Iraq's humanitarian crisis.

Reset Our Military: As Obama removes our combat brigades from Iraq, he will send at least two additional brigades to Afghanistan, where the Taliban is resurgent. He will also provide our armed forces with the reset capability that they need. He will replace essential equipment, and he will ensure that our men and women in uniform get the care and support they have earned.

2) The Role of a 21st Century Commander-In-Chief

American military power is sustained by the patriotism of those who serve in uniform. They deserve the same commitment from their leaders. As president, Barack Obama will:

Make Wise, Informed Judgments About When to Send Our Troops into Harm’s Way:

The gravest decision that the president makes is when to use force. On the most important judgment of our generation, Barack Obama got it right when he opposed the war in Iraq. Obama believes that when we send our men and women into harm’s way, we must also clearly define the mission, prescribe concrete political and military objectives, seek out the advice of our military commanders, carefully evaluate the intelligence, plan accordingly, and ensure that our troops have the resources, support, and equipment they need to protect themselves and fulfill their mission,

Strengthen Civil-Military Relations: Barack Obama will establish sound, strategic leadership at the White House and the Pentagon and restore mutual respect and a common sense of purpose in civil-military relations. In recent years, dysfunction between civilian and military leaders has failed our nation. While those in uniform must follow the orders of their civilian leaders, they deserve civilian leadership that seeks and respects the counsel of uniformed professionals. As Commander-in-Chief, Barack Obama will draw upon the vital expertise of military leaders and will have a Defense Secretary who appreciates the counsel of the professional military.

Lead with Responsibility and Accountability: Presidents take responsibility for their decisions. As Harry Truman famously said about his Oval Office desk, “The buck stops here.” A commander in chief does not imply that the military is responsible for his administration’s command mistakes. Second, military leaders and senior national security officials should be assigned to positions and held accountable for performance based on their abilities, not in accord with political preferences or to reward loyalty. Finally, in the rare instances of wrongdoing (for example at Abu Ghraib), senior leaders should face the same accountability as enlisted personnel and junior officers. Malfeasance will occur, but can be corrected only by ensuring real accountability.

Act Multilaterally When We Can, Unilaterally Only When We Must: Barack Obama believes that No president should ever hesitate to use force – unilaterally if necessary – to protect America and our vital interests when we are attacked or imminently threatened. But when we use force in situations other than self-defense, we should make every effort to garner the clear support and participation of others – the kind of burden-sharing and support President George H.W. Bush rallied before he launched Operation Desert Storm.

3) Invest in a 21st Century Military

“Our country’s greatest military asset is the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States.”

Barack Obama, Chicago Foreign Affairs Council, April 23, 2007

For all the photo opportunities and bluster, George Bush will leave our nation with a crisis in military readiness. Our service men and women are being strained by repeated and lengthy deployments, and by missions for which they are still inadequately organized, trained, and equipped. Negative trends in recruitment and retention threaten the strength of the all-volunteer force. In allowing this to occur, President Bush is repeating mistakes made at the end of the Vietnam War that “hollowed out” our force. An Obama administration will rebuild a military that has been pushed to the breaking point.

Expand to Meet Military Needs on the Ground: A major stress on our troops comes from insufficient ground forces. Barack Obama supports plans to increase the size of the Army by 65,000 troops and the Marines by 27,000 troops. Increasing our end strength will help units retrain and re-equip properly between deployments and decrease the strain on military families.

Solve Recruitment and Retention Problems: A nation of 300 million strong should not be struggling to find enough qualified citizens to serve. Recruiting and retention problems have been swept under the rug by lowering standards and using the “Stop Loss” program to keep our servicemen and women in the force after their enlistment has expired. Even worse, the burdens of fixing these problems have been placed on the shoulders of young recruiting sergeants, instead of leadership in Washington. America needs a leader who can inspire today’s youth to serve our nation the same way President Kennedy once did—reaching out to youth, as well as the parents, teachers, coaches, and community and religious leaders who influence them. Barack Obama will make it a presidential imperative to restore the ethic of public service to the agenda of today’s youth, whether it be serving their local communities in such roles as teachers or first responders, or serving in the military and reserve forces or diplomatic corps that keep our nation free and safe.

Rebuild the Military for 21st-Century Tasks: As we rebuild our armed forces, we must meet the fullspectrum needs of the new century, not simply recreate the military of the Cold War era. In particular, we must focus on strengthening the ground force units and skills that military officers have dubbed “High Demand/Low Density.” The U.S. military must:

- Build up our special operations forces, civil affairs, information operations, engineers, foreign area officers, and other units and capabilities that remain in chronic short supply.
- Invest in foreign language training, cultural awareness, and human intelligence and other needed counterinsurgency and stabilization skillsets.
- Create a specialized military advisors corps, which will enable us to better build up local allies’ capacities to take on mutual threats.

Guarantee Our Ground Forces Have the Proper Training for New Challenges:

Obama is a co-sponsor of the Webb-Hagel plan to ensure that Soldiers and Marines have sufficient training time before they are sent into battle. This is not the case at the moment, where American forces are being rushed to Iraq and Afghanistan, often with less individual and unit training than is required.

Ensure the Care and Dignity of Our Troops When They Come Home: As the shameful events at Walter Reed hospital and the recent reports on growing numbers of homeless and unemployed veterans show, we are not taking proper care of our wounded warriors and veterans. As a grandson of a World War II veteran who went to college on the G.I. Bill, and as a member of the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, Barack Obama has fought to improve care for troops recovering from injuries, to combat homelessness among veterans, and to make the disability benefits process more equitable. He is also the sponsor of the Wounded Warrior bill to improve care for wounded troops recovering at military hospitals. In August, Obama laid out his comprehensive plan as president to build a 21st-century Department of Veterans Affairs, so that we will be able to uphold America’s sacred trust with our veterans.

Lift the Onerous Burdens on Our Troops and Their Families: Our military is built on families, and troops decide whether to re-enlist based largely on how their families are faring. We must better support those families of whom we are asking so much. An Obama administration will:

- **Create a Military Families Advisory Board:** Consisting of experts and family representatives from each service, it would help identify and develop actionable policies to ease the burden on spouses and families. The board would provide an institutionalized conduit (presently missing) for the evolving concerns of military families to be brought to the attention of senior policymakers and the public.
- **Work to Bring Pay Parity:** more in line with that of the private sector, as measured by the employment cost index (ECI).
- **End the “Back Door Draft” policies:** that allow an individual to be forced to remain on active duty after his or her enlistment has expired.
- **Establish regularity in deployments:** so that active duty and reserves know what they must expect, rather than the current trend of changing the deployment schedules after they have left home, which harms the morale of troops and their families.

Repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: It is time to put national security above divisive politics. More than 10,000 service men and women have been discharged for sexual orientation since the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy was implemented, at a cost of over

\$360 million. Many of those forced out had special skills in high demand, such as Arabic translators, engineers and pilots. At a time when the military is having a tough time recruiting and retaining troops, it is wrong to deny our country the service of brave, qualified people. As president, Obama will repeal Don't Ask Don't Tell.

“Anybody who is willing to serve our country and die on a battlefield for us and are patriots, that’s the criteria for whether or not they should be able to serve in our military,” Barack Obama, Charles City, IA, Oct. 5, 2007

4) Restore the Readiness of America’s National Guard and Reserves

“We cannot accept second-class care for the brave men and women of the Guard and Reserves. They fight in the same war as their active-duty compatriots. They must not slip through holes in our safety net when they return to civilian life.” Barack Obama, Waterloo, Iowa, October 3, 2007

Like their active-duty counterparts, the National Guard and Reserves have been stretched thin by the administration’s flawed strategy, diverted from critical homeland security missions, and under-resourced. As President, Barack Obama will:

Restore the Deployment Policies Under Which the Reserve and Guard Enlisted:

America should recommit to the broken promises made to the men and women who serve in the Guard and Reserves. An Obama administration will:

- Limit lengthy deployments to one year for every six years,
- Restore the 24-month limit on cumulative deployment time,
- End the “Stop-Loss” program of forcing troops to stay in service beyond their expected commitments.

Ensure the Guard and Reserves Can Meet their Homeland Security Missions: The poor readiness of America’s Guard and Reserve forces threatens our ability to respond to natural disasters or terrorist attacks at home. We saw this, sadly, after both Hurricane Katrina and the tornadoes in Kansas. Because of the depletion of its resources in Iraq, the National Guard is less ready today than it was on 9/11. Nearly 90 percent of units have serious equipment shortages; many have less than 1/3 of the equipment they require. A particular focus of Obama’s plan will be to reverse the trend of “cross-leveling,” the cannibalizing of soldiers and machines from units back home for missions abroad.

Make the Reserve and National Guard Components Whole: Today, the selected Reserve makes up 37 percent of the total force, but only receives 3 percent of the equipment funding and 8 percent of total DOD budget. Barack Obama will resource and equip the Reserve and Guard to meet their missions not only overseas and, but also at home. Barack Obama’s administration will consult regularly with governors of the 50 states on the needs of their Guard units.

Give the Guard a Seat at the Table: Too often, top-level military decisions, which impact the National Guard, are made without its input. Obama cosponsored legislation to elevate the Chief of the National Guard to the rank of four-star general and make the chief a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top military advisory panel to the president. As president, Obama will sign this legislation into law.

Treat our Citizen Soldiers with the Respect They Deserve: In a 2007 survey, 50 percent of employers report that they are now less likely to hire reservists. As President, Barack Obama will:

- Fight Guard/Reserves Employment discrimination. Unlike what is happening today, Barack Obama will not allow his Justice Department to ignore the ongoing abuse of reservists' employment rights.
- Ensure that reservists and Guard members are treated fairly when it comes to employment, health, and education benefits, including ensuring that they can keep the education benefits that they gain while in service (currently, reservists must forfeit them, once their active deployment time ends).

Help Military Families Cope with Deployments: When a guardsman or reservist is called away for active duty, their spouses have to make a tremendous transition and often struggle to balance work and family obligations. Barack Obama will expand Family Medical Leave to include reserve families facing mobilization. This will allow workers whose spouse is called to active duty to get their affairs in order, without losing their jobs.

Improve Transition Services: As president, Obama will ensure that the military and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) coordinate to provide a truly seamless transition for service members from military to civilian life, including for reservists. Obama's plan will be modeled on legislation he introduced to standardize electronic records for active duty and transitioned them intact to the VA upon separation and to enhance military and VA outreach to separating members of the National Guard and Reserves. An Obama administration will also:

- **Make Mental Health Services a Priority.** Veterans coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan are reporting record levels of problems stemming from the after-effects of combat stress (49 percent in one survey), but only 3 states have a psychological coordinator to serve local Reserve and Guard vets in need. Obama will ensure that veterans in all 50 states have this support and that baseline screening happens while they are on active duty (this will both ensure early outreach for those in need, as well as ensure reservist rights in any disability hearings).
- **Extend the Window for New Veterans:** to enroll in the VA from two years to five years, because adjustments back to civilian life take time.
- **Expand Vet Centers in Rural Areas:** so that veterans and their families can get the care they need where they live.

5) Build Defense Capabilities for the 21st Century

“We must use this moment both to rebuild our military and to prepare it for the missions of the future.” Barack Obama, Foreign Affairs magazine, July 2007

For all the “transformation,” our budgeting for military hardware remains focused on weapons systems that deal with threats from the past, inadequately addressing current needs and the changing security environment. Even worse, many of these multi-billion systems will not be available for decades, when our troops need support today. An Obama administration will:

Fully Equip Our Troops for the Missions They Face: We must listen to our ground commanders when they tell us what kinds of technology and skills they need to fight most effectively. We cannot repeat the failure to swiftly deploy up-armored vehicles in response to insurgent tactics. We must prioritize getting vitally needed equipment to our Soldiers and Marines before lives are lost.

Review Weapons Programs: Each major defense program will be reevaluated in light of current needs, gaps in the field, and likely future threat scenarios in the post 9-11 world. We must rebalance our capabilities to ensure that our forces can succeed in both conventional war-fighting and in stabilization and counter-insurgency operations.

Preserve Global Reach in the Air: We must preserve our unparalleled airpower capabilities to deter and defeat any conventional competitors, swiftly respond to crises across the globe, and support our ground forces. Airpower is critical to American security, but relying solely on old systems from a past century will not suffice.

We must adapt and make tradeoffs among systems originally designed for the Cold War and those required for current and future challenges. We need greater investment in advanced technology ranging from the revolutionary, like unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic warfare capabilities, to systems like the C-17 cargo and KC-X air refueling aircraft—which may not be glamorous to politicians, but are the backbone of our future ability to extend global power.

Maintain Power Projection at Sea: The sea remains vital for global commerce and as a security domain, offering access in times of crises and enabling the United States to sustain global partnerships. Along with our maritime partners, we must ensure that potential ocean choke points remain open, protect the undersea fiber optic network that powers globalization, and protect the growing percentage of global energy supplies derived from offshore, undersea fields. Unconventional threats also require improving our ability to patrol and protect the “brown” waters of river systems important to our friends and allies and the “green” waters close to our shores. As we redeploy more and more of our troops home to the continental United States, maintaining “command of the seas” and joint “sea basing” capabilities will be more important than ever. We must recapitalize our naval forces, replacing aging ships and modernizing existing platforms, while adapting them to the 21st century. To maintain the size of the fleet at an affordable cost, Obama will modernize the many capable ships that we now have and tilt the investment balance towards more capable, smaller combatants, while maintaining the Navy’s ability to command the seas. He will support sea basing ships capable of supporting humanitarian missions as well as combat missions. He will increase investment in riverine craft and small coastal patrol craft, and ensure the maximum interoperability between the Navy and the Coast Guard. Obama endorses the concept of the Littoral Combat Ship, with its modular design to meet changing needs. However, the process to build the ship was flawed, and indicative of a broader failure in the Navy’s acquisition process. As part of its overall defense reforms, Obama administration will prioritize fixing the naval acquisitions system. He will also work to maintain the shipbuilding design and industrial bases, and support increased R&D for naval forces.

Defend Against Nuclear Attack, the Smart Way: In a world with nuclear weapons, America must continue efforts to defend against the mass destruction of its citizens and our allies. But past efforts were both wasteful and ineffective, pursued with neither honesty nor realism about their costs and shortfalls. We must seek a nuclear missile defense and demand that those efforts use resources wisely to build systems that would actually be effective. Missile defense requires far more rigorous testing to ensure that it is cost-effective and, most importantly, will work. Barack Obama has been a leader to ensure that we are investing in sound defenses not merely against missiles, but also against the more likely scenarios of attack, via ‘loose nukes’ and the terrorist delivering a

weapons of mass destruction to the United States. Finally, our deployment of missile defense systems should be done in a way that reinforces, rather than undercuts, our alliances, involving partnership and burdensharing with organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Obama Will Set Goal of Nuclear-Free World: Barack Obama will set a new direction and show the world that America believes in the commitment made under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work to ultimately eliminate nuclear stockpiles. Obama has said that America will not disarm unilaterally. Indeed, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will retain a strong nuclear deterrent, but Obama will set new course for our nation and the world to reduce reliance on these weapons and prevent them from getting into dangerous hands – whether they are states or terrorists.

Obama Will Secure Nuclear Weapons Materials in Four Years: Barack Obama will lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons materials at vulnerable sites within four years – the most effective way to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb. Barack Obama will work with Russia to make sure nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials in Russia and around the world are secured. He will work with other countries to develop and implement a comprehensive set of standards to protect nuclear materials from theft. He also will increase the pace at which nuclear security detectors are placed at key border crossings.

Obama Will Work with Russia to Take Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert: The United States and Russia have thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. Barack Obama believes that we should take our nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert – something that George W. Bush promised to do when he was campaigning for president in 2000. Maintaining this Cold War stance today is unnecessary and increases the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch. As president, Obama will work with Russia to find common ground and bring significantly more weapons off hair-trigger alert.

Obama Will Negotiate to Dramatically Reduce Nuclear Stockpiles: With thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons on each side, both the United States and Russia have not made sufficient progress to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals. This has undermined their commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and their efforts to secure and reduce the spread of nuclear weapons and materials around the world. Barack Obama will start by verifiably ending production of fissile material for weapons and by gaining agreement not to build new weapons. He will seek deep cuts with Russia and other nuclear powers to reduce global stockpiles dramatically by the end of his presidency.

Protect the U.S in Cyberspace: The 21st century also may see new domains of conflict. Given the huge reliance of our nation, and the wider global economy, on commerce, communications, and critical infrastructure that link to the virtual world, we must anticipate and prepare to defend against potential attacks. An Obama administration will work in cooperation with our allies and the private sector toward identifying and protecting against emerging cyber-threats.

Ensure Freedom of Space: America's ability to use space as a location for its satellites and communications grid is critical to our national security and economy. Unfortunately, this issue has been ignored and many nations are preparing to threaten space as a commons available to all nations. An Obama administration will:

- Restore U.S. leadership on space issues by seeking code of conduct for space-faring nations, including a worldwide ban on weapons to interfere with satellites and a ban on testing anti-satellite weapons. Initiating and stating a willingness to participate in a regime protecting access to space will help the United States return to a position of leadership in promoting global stability.
- Thoroughly assess possible threats to U.S. space assets and the best options, military and diplomatic, for countering them. This will include establishing contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets and accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack.

6) Develop Additional Tools to Promote Global Stability:

“I will increase both the numbers and capabilities of our diplomats, development experts, and other civilians who can work alongside our military. We can't just say there is no military solution to these problems. We need to integrate all aspects of American might.”

– Barack Obama, Washington, D.C. August 1, 2007

We have inherited a national security organizational structure that was developed and organized in the late 1940s to win the Cold War. It remains a rigid bureaucracy of government agencies, relying upon a restrictive and stovepiped set of legal authorities, with far greater operational capacity to destroy than to build other nations. Confronting the security challenges of the 21st century requires not just defeating armed enemies, but becoming a force for stability and opportunity throughout the world. One of the best ways to support the brave men and women in our armed forces is to address the great imbalance in our executive branch capacity for dealing with 21st-century challenges that aren't of a purely military nature. While many of these policies are detailed in Obama's foreign policy initiatives, some demand inclusion in Obama's vision of national defense.

An Obama administration will:

- **Establish an Expeditionary Capability:** within non-Pentagon agencies (State Department, US Agency for International Development, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, etc.) to deploy personnel where they are needed. These civilians will be integrated with, and sometimes operate independently from, our military expeditionary capabilities. This will help move troops out of civilian roles, as well as bring in the experts with the right expertise and skills.
- **Create a Civilian Assistance Corps (CAC):** There is presently no mechanism for civilians with special skill-sets (be they doctors, lawyers, engineers, city planners, agriculture specialists, police, etc.) and a sense of service, to be trained and organized to help their nation when it needs them. The Civilian Assistance Corps (modeled after similar auxiliary groups in Virginia and California) would provide each federal agency a pool of volunteer experts willing to deploy in crises. They would be pre-trained and screened for deployment to supplement departments' expeditionary teams. The creation of such a corps would ensure that true experts carry out tasks such as restoring electricity or creating banking systems, rather than the current practice of expecting already overburdened soldiers to assume these roles. An Obama administration will set a goal of creating a national CAC of 25,000 personnel.

7) Build Partnerships and Leverage Capacity at Home and Abroad

“The United States cannot steal every secret, penetrate every cell, act on every tip, or track down every terrorist -- nor should we have to do this alone. This is not just about our security. It is about the common security of all the world.” – Barack Obama, Washington, D.C. August 1, 2007

In the 21st century, there is no virtue in going it alone, when you could have friends by your side. Equally, there is no wisdom in employing only military power when so many threats in the 21st century are not just military in nature, and when so many other tools of national power could be more effective. And yet, under the Bush administration, we have had a singularly militarized, unilateral approach, undercutting our long-term security. An Obama administration will regain the participation of our friends and allies in the effort to meet mutual security goals and it will harness all of the elements of national power to address the challenges we face in the 21st century.

Increase the Participation of Our Allies in Meeting Our Common Security

Challenges: America’s traditional alliances, such as NATO, must be transformed and strengthened to focus on partnering in homeland security and counter-terrorism. The “Global Maritime Partnerships” concept, developed by the Chief of Naval Operations, seeks to leverage the naval forces of friends and allies to expand the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy. This is a sound initiative and it should be expanded, where possible, into the planning of all our military forces to shape the global security environment. Obama will build alliances and ensure our allies contribute their fair share to our common security.

Organize to Help Our Partners and Allies When They Are in Need: Our military engages in a wide range of humanitarian activities that build friends and allies at the regional and ground level, most remarkably during the response to the tsunami in South and Southeast Asia. This demonstration of American military professionalism and aid won back local hearts in key Muslim states. Yet, such strategic and high pay off programs are presently not included in long-term planning and, when they do occur, actually take away funds from a unit’s regular operational budget. The result is that the United States sometimes misses opportunities to build partnerships and trust. The Obama administration will expand such programs, regularizing them into the annual budget so that our efforts to aid allies, and win hearts and minds along the way, are sustainable, rather than ad-hoc.

Enhance Military to Military Cooperation, Particularly in the Muslim World : An Obama administration will strengthen and expand our global network of military to military cooperation, in order to build a climate that can defuse tensions when they arise. Existing U.S. programs of military to military exchanges, joint training, education, and human rights programs must be reoriented from their current Cold War standards to reflect new strategic priorities and ethical standards. Relationships that reassure potential future competitors both of America’s goodwill and its strength may help dissuade emerging powers from becoming threats. An Obama administration will also prioritize the strengthening training and working relationships with the next generation of military leaders in allied states in the Muslim and wider developing world, in order to build professionalism and respect for rights and democracy, as well as open and sustain unofficial channels of communication and influence.

8) Reform Contracting

"We cannot win a fight for hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable contractors. To add insult to injury, these contractors are charging taxpayers up to nine times more to do the same jobs as soldiers, a disparity that damages troop morale." Barack Obama, Iowa City, October 3, 2007.

From Blackwater in Iraq and even in post-Katrina New Orleans to contract interrogators involved in the Abu Ghraib prison abuses, we have turned over too much of the public missions of defense and foreign policy to private firms interested primarily in profit.

There are more than 160,000 private contractors working in Iraq, paid salaries far more than our servicemen and women, and yet not held to the same legal standards. Even worse, a lack of planning, oversight and management of these contractors has repeatedly undermined our troops' efforts in the field.

Foresight on Military Contractors: Barack Obama is the original sponsor of the "Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007," the first effort by the Senate to solve these problems, through a combination of smart public policy and good business sense. Almost every candidate running for president has talked about this issue to the press. Barack Obama has actually taken action, and did so some eight months before the recent tragedy in Baghdad involving Blackwater shootings of civilians. It is yet another demonstration of his foresight and judgment on the issues that matter, rather than waiting for the polls to determine his position after the fact. It must also be noted that he is not represented by the same firms and lobbyists that have represented firms like Blackwater, nor does he accept campaign donations from them.

Create Transparency for Military Contractors: Obama's legislation will:

- Create the reporting requirements, accounting, and accountability needed for good governance and actual money savings with contracting.
- Require the Pentagon to develop a strategy for figuring out when contracting makes sense and when it doesn't, rather than continually handing off governmental jobs to well-connected companies.
- Establish the legal status of contractor personnel, making possible prosecution of any abuses committed by private military contractors.

"Most contractors act as if the law doesn't apply to them. Under my plan, if contractors break the law, they will be prosecuted." Barack Obama, University of Iowa, Oct. 3, 2007

Restore Honesty, Openness, and Commonsense to Contracting and Procurement: 40 percent of Pentagon acquisitions come in over cost and an estimated 5 percent of the overall budget is lost through corruption. Barack Obama's bill is one step within a larger set of initiatives that are needed to wring out savings by reducing the corruption and cost overruns that have become all too routine in defense contracting. As president, Obama will:

- Launch a program of acquisition reform and management to gain massive savings in the Pentagon budget, including a special focus on ending the common practice of no-bid contracting. Good competition builds good business, so the days of giving billion dollar contracts to companies like Halliburton and KBR without competition will be over.
- End the abuse of the supplemental budgets, where much of the money has been lost, by creating system of oversight for war funds as stringent as in the regular budget.
- Restore the government's ability to manage contracts, by rebuilding our contract officer corps.

- Order the Justice Department to prioritize prosecutions that will punish and deter waste and theft that undermines security, and
- Enact a program of market incentives and sanctions for Pentagon contractors, just like any other good business client would use, to reward companies that perform well and come in under budget, while punishing firms that fail to perform as originally hired.

Additional Resources:

For more information on Barack Obama's vision

- Strengthen America's security, please go to
<http://my.barackobama.com/page/-/pdf/Fact%20percent20Sheet%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf>
- End the War in Iraq, please go to
<http://my.barackobama.com/page/-/pdf/Fact%20percent20Sheet%20percent20Iraq%20Final.pdf>
- A New Beginning to America on Foreign Policy, please go to
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/10/02/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_27.php
- Protect the American homeland, please go to
<http://www.barackobama.com/issues/homeland>
- Ensure Veteran's rights, please go to
<http://www.barackobama.com/issues/veterans/>
- Win the Battle Against Terrorism, please go to
<http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/CounterterrorismFactSheet.pdf>
- Strengthening Our Common Security by Investing in Our Common Humanity, please go to
<http://my.barackobama.com/page/-/HQpress/11.25.07Dem%20Dev%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf>

APPENDIX C
Barack Obama's Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center
1 August 2007

Thank you Lee, for hosting me here at the Wilson Center, and for your leadership of both the 9/11 Commission and the Iraq Study Group. You have been a steady voice of reason in an unsteady time. Let me also say that my thoughts and prayers are with your colleague, Haleh Esfandiari, and her family. I have made my position known to the Iranian government. It is time for Haleh to be released. It is time for Haleh to come home.

Thanks to the 9/11 Commission, we know that six years ago this week President Bush received a briefing with the headline: "Bin Laden determined to strike in U.S."

It came during what the Commission called the "summer of threat," when the "system was blinking red" about an impending attack. But despite the briefing, many felt the danger was overseas, a threat to embassies and military installations. The extremism, the resentment, the terrorist training camps, and the killers were in the dark corners of the world, far away from the American homeland.

Then, one bright and beautiful Tuesday morning, they were here.

I was driving to a state legislative hearing in downtown Chicago when I heard the news on my car radio: a plane had hit the World Trade Center. By the time I got to my meeting, the second plane had hit, and we were told to evacuate.

People gathered in the streets and looked up at the sky and the Sears Tower, transformed from a workplace to a target. We feared for our families and our country. We mourned the terrible loss suffered by our fellow citizens. Back at my law office, I watched the images from New York: a plane vanishing into glass and steel; men and women clinging to windowsills, then letting go; tall towers crumbling to dust. It seemed all of the misery and all of the evil in the world were in that rolling black cloud, blocking out the September sun.

What we saw that morning forced us to recognize that in a new world of threats, we are no longer protected by our own power. And what we saw that morning was a challenge to a new generation. The history of America is one of tragedy turned into triumph. And so a war over secession became an opportunity to set the captives free. An attack on Pearl Harbor led to a wave of freedom rolling across the Atlantic and Pacific. An Iron Curtain was punctured by democratic values, new institutions at home, and strong international partnerships abroad.

After 9/11, our calling was to write a new chapter in the American story. To devise new strategies and build new alliances, to secure our homeland and safeguard our values, and to serve a just cause abroad. We were ready. Americans were united. Friends around the world stood shoulder to shoulder with us. We had the might and moral-suasion that was the legacy of generations of Americans. The tide of history seemed poised to turn, once again, toward hope.

But then everything changed.

We did not finish the job against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. We did not develop new capabilities to defeat a new enemy, or launch a comprehensive strategy to dry up the terrorists' base of support. We did not reaffirm our basic values, or secure our homeland.

Instead, we got a color-coded politics of fear. Patriotism as the possession of one political party. The diplomacy of refusing to talk to other countries. A rigid 20th century ideology that insisted that the 21st century's stateless terrorism could be defeated through the invasion and occupation of a state. A deliberate strategy to misrepresent 9/11 to sell a war against a country that had nothing to do with 9/11.

And so, a little more than a year after that bright September day, I was in the streets of Chicago again, this time speaking at a rally in opposition to war in Iraq. I did not oppose all wars, I said. I was a strong supporter of the war in Afghanistan. But I said I could not support "a dumb war, a rash war" in Iraq. I worried about a "U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences" in the heart of the Muslim world. I pleaded that we "finish the fight with bin Laden and al Qaeda."

The political winds were blowing in a different direction. The President was determined to go to war. There was just one obstacle: the U.S. Congress. Nine days after I spoke, that obstacle was removed. Congress rubber-stamped the rush to war, giving the President the broad and open-ended authority he

uses to this day. With that vote, Congress became co-author of a catastrophic war. And we went off to fight on the wrong battlefield, with no appreciation of how many enemies we would create, and no plan for how to get out.

Because of a war in Iraq that should never have been authorized and should never have been waged, we are now less safe than we were before 9/11.

According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the threat to our homeland from al Qaeda is “persistent and evolving.” Iraq is a training ground for terror, torn apart by civil war. Afghanistan is more violent than it has been since 2001. Al Qaeda has a sanctuary in Pakistan. Israel is besieged by emboldened enemies, talking openly of its destruction. Iran is now presenting the broadest strategic challenge to the United States in the Middle East in a generation. Groups affiliated with or inspired by al Qaeda operate worldwide. Six years after 9/11, we are again in the midst of a “summer of threat,” with bin Laden and many more terrorists determined to strike in the United States.

What’s more, in the dark halls of Abu Ghraib and the detention cells of Guantanamo, we have compromised our most precious values. What could have been a call to a generation has become an excuse for unchecked presidential power. A tragedy that united us was turned into a political wedge issue used to divide us.

It is time to turn the page. It is time to write a new chapter in our response to 9/11.

Just because the President misrepresents our enemies does not mean we do not have them. The terrorists are at war with us. The threat is from violent extremists who are a small minority of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, but the threat is real. They distort Islam. They kill man, woman and child; Christian and Hindu, Jew and Muslim. They seek to create a repressive caliphate. To defeat this enemy, we must understand who we are fighting against, and what we are fighting for.

The President would have us believe that every bomb in Baghdad is part of al Qaeda’s war against us, not an Iraqi civil war. He elevates al Qaeda in Iraq – which didn’t exist before our invasion – and overlooks the people who hit us on 9/11, who are training new recruits in Pakistan. He lumps together groups with very different goals: al Qaeda and Iran, Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents. He confuses our mission.

And worse – he is fighting the war the terrorists want us to fight. Bin Laden and his allies know they cannot defeat us on the field of battle or in a genuine battle of ideas. But they can provoke the reaction we’ve seen in Iraq: a misguided invasion of a Muslim country that sparks new insurgencies, ties down our military, busts our budgets, increases the pool of terrorist recruits, alienates America, gives democracy a bad name, and prompts the American people to question our engagement in the world. By refusing to end the war in Iraq, President Bush is giving the terrorists what they really want, and what the Congress voted to give them in 2002: a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences.

It is time to turn the page. When I am President, we will wage the war that has to be won, with a comprehensive strategy with five elements: getting out of Iraq and on to the right battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing the capabilities and partnerships we need to take out the terrorists and the world’s most deadly weapons; engaging the world to dry up support for terror and extremism; restoring our values; and securing a more resilient homeland.

The first step must be getting off the wrong battlefield in Iraq, and taking the fight to the terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I introduced a plan in January that would have already started bringing our troops out of Iraq, with a goal of removing all combat brigades by March 31, 2008. If the President continues to veto this plan, then ending this war will be my first priority when I take office.

There is no military solution in Iraq. Only Iraq’s leaders can settle the grievances at the heart of Iraq’s civil war. We must apply pressure on them to act, and our best leverage is reducing our troop presence. And we must also do the hard and sustained diplomatic work in the region on behalf of peace and stability.

In ending the war, we must act with more wisdom than we started it. That is why my plan would maintain sufficient forces in the region to target al Qaeda within Iraq. But we must recognize that al Qaeda is not the primary source of violence in Iraq, and has little support – not from Shia and Kurds

who al Qaeda has targeted, or Sunni tribes hostile to foreigners. On the contrary, al Qaeda's appeal within Iraq is enhanced by our troop presence.

Ending the war will help isolate al Qaeda and give Iraqis the incentive and opportunity to take them out. It will also allow us to direct badly needed resources to Afghanistan. Our troops have fought valiantly there, but Iraq has deprived them of the support they need—and deserve. As a result, parts of Afghanistan are falling into the hands of the Taliban, and a mix of terrorism, drugs, and corruption threatens to overwhelm the country.

As President, I would deploy at least two additional brigades to Afghanistan to re-enforce our counter-terrorism operations and support NATO's efforts against the Taliban. As we step up our commitment, our European friends must do the same, and without the burdensome restrictions that have hampered NATO's efforts. We must also put more of an Afghan face on security by improving the training and equipping of the Afghan Army and Police, and including Afghan soldiers in U.S. and NATO operations.

We must not, however, repeat the mistakes of Iraq. The solution in Afghanistan is not just military – it is political and economic. As President, I would increase our non-military aid by \$1 billion. These resources should fund projects at the local level to impact ordinary Afghans, including the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers. And we must seek better performance from the Afghan government, and support that performance through tough anti-corruption safeguards on aid, and increased international support to develop the rule of law across the country.

Above all, I will send a clear message: we will not repeat the mistake of the past, when we turned our back on Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal. As 9/11 showed us, the security of Afghanistan and America is shared. And today, that security is most threatened by the al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuary in the tribal regions of northwest Pakistan.

Al Qaeda terrorists train, travel, and maintain global communications in this safe-haven. The Taliban pursues a hit and run strategy, striking in Afghanistan, then skulking across the border to safety.

This is the wild frontier of our globalized world. There are wind-swept deserts and cave-dotted mountains. There are tribes that see borders as nothing more than lines on a map, and governments as forces that come and go. There are blood ties deeper than alliances of convenience, and pockets of extremism that follow religion to violence. It's a tough place.

But that is no excuse. There must be no safe-haven for terrorists who threaten America. We cannot fail to act because action is hard.

As President, I would make the hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. military aid to Pakistan conditional, and I would make our conditions clear: Pakistan must make substantial progress in closing down the training camps, evicting foreign fighters, and preventing the Taliban from using Pakistan as a staging area for attacks in Afghanistan.

I understand that President Musharraf has his own challenges. But let me make this clear. There are terrorists holed up in those mountains who murdered 3,000 Americans. They are plotting to strike again. It was a terrible mistake to fail to act when we had a chance to take out an al Qaeda leadership meeting in 2005. If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won't act, we will.

And Pakistan needs more than F-16s to combat extremism. As the Pakistani government increases investment in secular education to counter radical *madrasas*, my Administration will increase America's commitment. We must help Pakistan invest in the provinces along the Afghan border, so that the extremists' program of hate is met with one of hope. And we must not turn a blind eye to elections that are neither free nor fair – our goal is not simply an ally in Pakistan, it is a democratic ally.

Beyond Pakistan, there is a core of terrorists – probably in the tens of thousands – who have made their choice to attack America. So the second step in my strategy will be to build our capacity and our partnerships to track down, capture or kill terrorists around the world, and to deny them the world's most dangerous weapons. I will not hesitate to use military force to take out terrorists who pose a direct threat to America. This requires a broader set of capabilities, as outlined in the Army and Marine Corps's new counter-insurgency manual. I will ensure that our military becomes more stealth, agile, and lethal in its ability to capture or kill terrorists. We need to recruit, train, and equip our armed

forces to better target terrorists, and to help foreign militaries to do the same. This must include a program to bolster our ability to speak different languages, understand different cultures, and coordinate complex missions with our civilian agencies.

To succeed, we must improve our civilian capacity. The finest military in the world is adapting to the challenges of the 21st century. But it cannot counter insurgent and terrorist threats without civilian counterparts who can carry out economic and political reconstruction missions – sometimes in dangerous places. As President, I will strengthen these civilian capacities, recruiting our best and brightest to take on this challenge. I will increase both the numbers and capabilities of our diplomats, development experts, and other civilians who can work alongside our military. We can't just say there is no military solution to these problems. We need to integrate all aspects of American might.

One component of this integrated approach will be new Mobile Development Teams that bring together personnel from the State Department, the Pentagon, and USAID. These teams will work with civil society and local governments to make an immediate impact in peoples' lives, and to turn the tide against extremism. Where people are most vulnerable, where the light of hope has grown dark, and where we are in a position to make a real difference in advancing security and opportunity – that is where these teams will go.

I will also strengthen our intelligence. This is about more than an organizational chart. We need leadership that forces our agencies to share information, and leadership that never – ever – twists the facts to support bad policies. But we must also build our capacity to better collect and analyze information, and to carry out operations to disrupt terrorist plots and break up terrorist networks.

This cannot just be an American mission. Al Qaeda and its allies operate in nearly 100 countries. The United States cannot steal every secret, penetrate every cell, act on every tip, or track down every terrorist – nor should we have to do this alone. This is not just about our security. It is about the common security of all the world.

As President, I will create a Shared Security Partnership Program to forge an international intelligence and law enforcement infrastructure to take down terrorist networks from the remote islands of Indonesia, to the sprawling cities of Africa. This program will provide \$5 billion over three years for counter-terrorism cooperation with countries around the world, including information sharing, funding for training, operations, border security, anti-corruption programs, technology, and targeting terrorist financing. And this effort will focus on helping our partners succeed without repressive tactics, because brutality breeds terror, it does not defeat it.

We must also do more to safeguard the world's most dangerous weapons. We know al Qaeda seeks a nuclear weapon. We know they would not hesitate to use one. Yet there is still about 50 tons of highly enriched uranium, some of it poorly secured, at civilian nuclear facilities in over forty countries. There are still about 15,000 to 16,000 nuclear weapons and stockpiles of uranium and plutonium scattered across 11 time zones in the former Soviet Union.

That is why I worked in the Senate with Dick Lugar to pass a law that would help the United States and our allies detect and stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. That is why I am introducing a bill with Chuck Hagel that seeks to prevent nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear arsenals, and stop the spread of nuclear weapons. And that is why, as President, I will lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons and material at vulnerable sites within four years. While we work to secure existing stockpiles, we should also negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material.

And I won't hesitate to use the power of American diplomacy to stop countries from obtaining these weapons or sponsoring terror. The lesson of the Bush years is that not talking does not work. Go down the list of countries we've ignored and see how successful that strategy has been. We haven't talked to Iran, and they continue to build their nuclear program. We haven't talked to Syria, and they continue support for terror. We tried not talking to North Korea, and they now have enough material for 6 to 8 more nuclear weapons.

It's time to turn the page on the diplomacy of tough talk and no action. It's time to turn the page on Washington's conventional wisdom that agreement must be reached before you meet, that talking to other countries is some kind of reward, and that Presidents can only meet with people who will tell them what they want to hear.

President Kennedy said it best: "Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate." Only by knowing your adversary can you defeat them or drive wedges between them. As President, I will work with our friend and allies, but I won't outsource our diplomacy in Tehran to the Europeans, or our diplomacy in Pyongyang to the Chinese. I will do the careful preparation needed, and let these countries know where America stands. They will no longer have the excuse of American intransigence. They will have our terms: no support for terror and no nuclear weapons.

But America must be about more than taking out terrorists and locking up weapons, or else new terrorists will rise up to take the place of every one we capture or kill. That is why the third step in my strategy will be drying up the rising well of support for extremism.

When you travel to the world's trouble spots as a United States Senator, much of what you see is from a helicopter. So you look out, with the buzz of the rotor in your ear, maybe a door gunner nearby, and you see the refugee camp in Darfur, the flood near Djibouti, the bombed out block in Baghdad. You see thousands of desperate faces.

Al Qaeda's new recruits come from Africa and Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Many come from disaffected communities and disconnected corners of our interconnected world. And it makes you stop and wonder: when those faces look up at an American helicopter, do they feel hope, or do they feel hate?

We know where extremists thrive. In conflict zones that are incubators of resentment and anarchy. In weak states that cannot control their borders or territory, or meet the basic needs of their people. From Africa to central Asia to the Pacific Rim—nearly 60 countries stand on the brink of conflict or collapse. The extremists encourage the exploitation of these hopeless places on their hate-filled websites.

And we know what the extremists say about us. America is just an occupying Army in Muslim lands, the shadow of a shrouded figure standing on a box at Abu Ghraib, the power behind the throne of a repressive leader. They say we are at war with Islam. That is the whispered line of the extremist who has nothing to offer in this battle of ideas but blame—blame America, blame progress, blame Jews. And often he offers something along with the hate. A sense of empowerment. Maybe an education at a *madrasa*, some charity for your family, some basic services in the neighborhood. And then: a mission and a gun.

We know we are not who they say we are. America is at war with terrorists who killed on our soil. We are not at war with Islam. America is a compassionate nation that wants a better future for all people. The vast majority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims have no use for bin Laden or his bankrupt ideas. But too often since 9/11, the extremists have defined us, not the other way around.

When I am President, that will change. We will author our own story.

We do need to stand for democracy. And I will. But democracy is about more than a ballot box. America must show—through deeds as well as words—that we stand with those who seek a better life. That child looking up at the helicopter must see America and feel hope.

As President, I will make it a focus of my foreign policy to roll back the tide of hopelessness that gives rise to hate. Freedom must mean freedom from fear, not the freedom of anarchy. I will never shrug my shoulders and say—as Secretary Rumsfeld did—"Freedom is untidy." I will focus our support on helping nations build independent judicial systems, honest police forces, and financial systems that are transparent and accountable. Freedom must also mean freedom from want, not freedom lost to an empty stomach. So I will make poverty reduction a key part of helping other nations reduce anarchy.

I will double our annual investments to meet these challenges to \$50 billion by 2012. And I will support a \$2 billion Global Education Fund to counter the radical *madrasas*—often funded by money from within Saudi Arabia—that have filled young minds with messages of hate. We must work for a world where every child, everywhere, is taught to build and not to destroy. And as we lead we will ask for more from our friends in Europe and Asia as well—more support for our diplomacy, more support for multilateral peacekeeping, and more support to rebuild societies ravaged by conflict.

I will also launch a program of public diplomacy that is a coordinated effort across my Administration, not a small group of political officials at the State Department explaining a misguided

war. We will open “America Houses” in cities across the Islamic world, with Internet, libraries, English lessons, stories of America’s Muslims and the strength they add to our country, and vocational programs. Through a new “America’s Voice Corps” we will recruit, train, and send out into the field talented young Americans who can speak with – and listen to – the people who today hear about us only from our enemies.

As President, I will lead this effort. In the first 100 days of my Administration, I will travel to a major Islamic forum and deliver an address to redefine our struggle. I will make clear that we are not at war with Islam, that we will stand with those who are willing to stand up for their future, and that we need their effort to defeat the prophets of hate and violence. I will speak directly to that child who looks up at that helicopter, and my message will be clear: “You matter to us. Your future is our future. And our moment is now.”

This brings me to the fourth step in my strategy: I will make clear that the days of compromising our values are over.

Major General Paul Eaton had a long and distinguished career serving this country. It included training the Iraqi Army. After Abu Ghraib, his senior Iraqi advisor came into his office and said: “You have no idea how this will play out on the streets of Baghdad and the rest of the Arab world. How can this be?” This was not the America he had looked up to.

As the counter-insurgency manual reminds us, we cannot win a war unless we maintain the high ground and keep the people on our side. But because the Administration decided to take the low road, our troops have more enemies. Because the Administration cast aside international norms that reflect American values, we are less able to promote our values. When I am President, America will reject torture without exception. America is the country that stood against that kind of behavior, and we will do so again.

I also will reject a legal framework that does not work. There has been only one conviction at Guantanamo. It was for a guilty plea on material support for terrorism. The sentence was 9 months. There has not been one conviction of a terrorist act. I have faith in America’s courts, and I have faith in our JAGs. As President, I will close Guantanamo, reject the Military Commissions Act, and adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Our Constitution and our Uniform Code of Military Justice provide a framework for dealing with the terrorists.

This Administration also puts forward a false choice between the liberties we cherish and the security we demand. I will provide our intelligence and law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to track and take out the terrorists without undermining our Constitution and our freedom.

That means no more illegal wire-tapping of American citizens. No more national security letters to spy on citizens who are not suspected of a crime. No more tracking citizens who do nothing more than protest a misguided war. No more ignoring the law when it is inconvenient. That is not who we are. And it is not what is necessary to defeat the terrorists. The FISA court works. The separation of powers works. Our Constitution

works. We will again set an example for the world that the law is not subject to the whims of stubborn rulers, and that justice is not arbitrary.

This Administration acts like violating civil liberties is the way to enhance our security. It is not. There are no short-cuts to protecting America, and that is why the fifth part of my strategy is doing the hard and patient work to secure a more resilient homeland.

Too often this Administration’s approach to homeland security has been to scatter money around and avoid hard choices, or to scare Americans without telling them what to be scared of, or what to do. A Department set up to make Americans feel safer didn’t even show up when bodies drifted through the streets in New Orleans. That’s not acceptable.

My Administration will take an approach to homeland security guided by risk. I will establish a Quadrennial Review at the Department of Homeland Security – just like at the Pentagon – to undertake a top to bottom review of the threats we face and our ability to confront them. And I will develop a comprehensive National Infrastructure Protection Plan that draws on both local know-how and national priorities.

We have to put resources where our infrastructure is most vulnerable. That means tough and permanent standards for securing our chemical plants. Improving our capability to screen cargo and

investing in safeguards that will prevent the disruption of our ports. And making sure our energy sector – our refineries and pipelines and power grids – is protected so that terrorists cannot cripple our economy.

We also have to get past a top-down approach. Folks across America are the ones on the front lines. On 9/11, it was citizens – empowered by their knowledge of the World Trade Center attacks – who protected our government by heroically taking action on Flight 93 to keep it from reaching our nation's capital. When I have information that can empower Americans, I will share it with them. Information sharing with state and local governments must be a two-way street, because we never know where the two pieces of the puzzle are that might fit together – the tip from Afghanistan, and the cop who sees something suspicious on Michigan Avenue. I will increase funding to help train police to gather information and connect it to the intelligence they receive from the federal government. I will address the problem in our prisons, where the most disaffected and disconnected Americans are being explicitly targeted for conversion by al Qaeda and its ideological allies.

And my Administration will not permit more lives to be lost because emergency responders are not outfitted with the communications capability and protective equipment their job requires, or because the federal government is too slow to respond when disaster strikes. We've been through that on 9/11. We've been through it during Katrina. I will ensure that we have the resources and competent federal leadership we need to support our communities when American lives are at stake.

But this effort can't just be about what we ask of our men and women in uniform. It can't just be about how we spend our time or our money.

It's about the kind of country we are.

We are in the early stages of a long struggle. Yet since 9/11, we've heard a lot about what America can't do or shouldn't do or won't even try. We can't vote against a misguided war in Iraq because that would make us look weak, or talk to other countries because that would be a reward. We can't reach out to the hundreds of millions of Muslims who reject terror because we worry they hate us. We can't protect the homeland because there are too many targets, or secure our people while staying true to our values. We can't get past the America of Red and Blue, the politics of who's up and who's down. That is not the America that I know.

The America I know is the last, best hope for that child looking up at a helicopter. It's the country that put a man on the moon; that defeated fascism and helped rebuild Europe. It's a country whose strength abroad is measured not just by armies, but rather by the power of our ideals, and by our purpose to forge an ever more perfect union at home.

That's the America I know. We just have to act like it again to write that next chapter in the American story. If we do, we can keep America safe while extending security and opportunity around the world. We can hold true to our values, and in doing so advance those values abroad. And we can be what that child looking up at a helicopter needs us to be: the relentless opponent of terror and tyranny, and the light of hope to the world.

To make this story reality, it's going to take Americans coming together and changing the fundamental direction of this country. It's going to take the service of a new generation of young people. It's going to take facing tragedy head-on and turning it into the next generation's triumph. That is a challenge that I welcome. Because when we do make that change, we'll do more than win a war – we'll live up to that calling to make America, and the world, safer, freer, and more hopeful than we found it.

APPENDIX D
Testimony of Hilary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State Designate
Confirmation Hearing before Senate Foreign Relations Committee
13 January, 2009

Thank you, Senator Schumer, for your generous introduction, and even more for your support and our partnership over so many years. You are a valued and trusted colleague, a friend, and a tribute to the people of New York whom you have served with such distinction throughout your career.

Mr. Chairman, I offer my congratulations as you take on this new role. You certainly have traveled quite a distance from that day in 1971 when you testified here as a young Vietnam veteran. You have never faltered in your care and concern for our nation, its foreign policy or its future, and America is in good hands with you leading this committee.

Senator Lugar, I look forward to working with you on a wide range of issues, especially those of greatest concern to you, including the Nunn-Lugar initiative.

And Senator Voinovich, I want to commend you for your service to the people of Ohio and ask for your help in the next two years on the management issues you champion.

It is an honor and a privilege to be here this morning as President-elect Obama's nominee for Secretary of State. I am deeply grateful for the trust — and keenly aware of the responsibility — that the President-elect has placed in me to serve our country and our people at a time of such grave dangers, and great possibilities. If confirmed, I will accept the duties of the office with gratitude, humility, and firm determination to represent the United States as energetically and faithfully as I can.

At the same time I must confess that sitting across the table from so many colleagues brings me sadness too. I love the Senate. And if you confirm me for this new role, it will be hard to say good-bye to so many members, Republicans and Democrats, whom I have come to know, admire, and respect deeply, and to the institution where I have been so proud to serve on behalf of the people of New York for the past eight years.

But I assure you that I will be in frequent consultation and conversation with the members of this committee, with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the appropriations committees, and with Congress as a whole. And I look forward to working with my good friend, Vice President-elect Biden, who has been a valued colleague in the Senate and valued chairman of this committee.

For me, consultation is not a catch-word. It is a commitment. The president-elect and I believe that we must return to the time-honored principle of bipartisanship in our foreign policy — an approach that past presidents of both parties, as well as members of this committee, have subscribed to and that has served our nation well. I look forward to working with all of you to renew America's leadership through diplomacy that enhances our security, advances our interests and reflects our values.

Today, nine years into a new century, Americans know that our nation and our world face great perils: from ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the continuing threat posed by terrorist extremists, to the spread of weapons of mass destruction; from the dangers of climate change to pandemic disease; from financial meltdown to worldwide poverty.

The 70 days since the presidential election offer fresh evidence of the urgency of these challenges. New conflict in Gaza; terrorist attacks in Mumbai; mass killings and rapes in the Congo; cholera in Zimbabwe; reports of record high greenhouse gases and rapidly melting glaciers; and even an ancient form of terror — piracy — asserting itself in modern form off the Horn of Africa.

Always, and especially in the crucible of these global challenges, our overriding duty is to protect and advance America's security, interests and values: First, we must keep our people, our nation and our allies secure. Second, we must promote economic growth and shared prosperity at home and abroad. Finally, we must strengthen America's position of global leadership — ensuring that we remain a positive force in the world, whether in working to preserve the health of our planet or expanding dignity and opportunity for people on the margins whose progress and prosperity will add to our own.

Our world has undergone an extraordinary transformation in the last two decades. In 1989, a wall fell and old barriers began to crumble after 40 years of a Cold War that had influenced every aspect of our foreign policy. By 1999, the rise of more democratic and open societies, the expanding reach of world markets, and the explosion of information technology had made "globalization" the word of the day. For most people, it had primarily an economic connotation, but in fact, we were already living in a profoundly interdependent world in which old rules and boundaries no longer held fast — one in which both the promise and the peril of the 21st century could not be contained by national borders or vast distances.

Economic growth has lifted more people out of poverty faster than at any time in history, but economic crises can sweep across the globe even more quickly. A coalition of nations stopped ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, but the conflict in

the Middle East continues to inflame tensions from Asia to Africa. Non-state actors fight poverty, improve health and expand education in the poorest parts of the world, while other non-state actors traffic in drugs, children, and women and kill innocent civilians across the globe.

Now, in 2009, the clear lesson of the last 20 years is that we must both combat the threats and seize the opportunities of our interdependence. And to be effective in doing so we must build a world with more partners and fewer adversaries.

America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America. The best way to advance America's interest in reducing global threats and seizing global opportunities is to design and implement global solutions. This isn't a philosophical point. This is our reality.

The president-elect and I believe that foreign policy must be based on a marriage of principles and pragmatism, not rigid ideology. On facts and evidence, not emotion or prejudice. Our security, our vitality, and our ability to lead in today's world oblige us to recognize the overwhelming fact of our interdependence.

I believe that American leadership has been wanting, but is still wanted. We must use what has been called "smart power," the full range of tools at our disposal — diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural — picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy. This is not a radical idea. The ancient Roman poet Terence, who was born a slave and rose to become one of the great voices of his time, declared that "in every endeavor, the seemly course for wise men is to try persuasion first." The same truth binds wise women as well.

The president-elect has made it clear that in the Obama administration there will be no doubt about the leading role of diplomacy. One need only look to North Korea, Iran, the Middle East and the Balkans to appreciate the absolute necessity of tough-minded, intelligent diplomacy — and the failures that result when that kind of diplomatic effort is absent. And one need only consider the assortment of problems we must tackle in 2009 — from fighting terrorism to climate change to global financial crises — to understand the importance of cooperative engagement.

I assure you that, if I am confirmed, the State Department will be firing on all cylinders to provide forward-thinking, sustained diplomacy in every part of the world; applying pressure and exerting leverage; cooperating with our military partners and other agencies of government; partnering effectively with [non-governmental organizations], the private sector, and international organizations;

using modern technologies for public outreach; empowering negotiators who can protect our interests while understanding those of our negotiating partners. There will be thousands of separate interactions, all strategically linked and coordinated to defend American security and prosperity. Diplomacy is hard work; but when we work hard, diplomacy can work, and not just to defuse tensions, but to achieve results that advance our security, interests and values.

Secretary Gates has been particularly eloquent in articulating the importance of diplomacy in pursuit of our national security and foreign policy objectives. As he notes, it's not often that a secretary of defense makes the case for adding resources to the State Department and elevating the role of the diplomatic corps. Thankfully, Secretary Gates is more concerned about having a unified, agile and effective U.S. strategy than in spending our precious time and energy on petty turf wars. As he has stated, "our civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long," both relative to military spending and to "the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world." And to that, I say, "Amen!"

President-elect Obama has emphasized that the State Department must be fully empowered and funded to confront multidimensional challenges — from working with allies to thwart terrorism to spreading health and prosperity in places of human suffering. I will speak in greater detail about that in a moment.

We should also use the United Nations and other international institutions whenever appropriate and possible. Both Democratic and Republican presidents have understood for decades that these institutions, when they work well, enhance our influence. And when they don't work well — as in the cases of Darfur and the farce of Sudan's election to the former U.N. Commission on Human Rights, for example — we should work with like-minded friends to make sure that these institutions reflect the values that motivated their creation in the first place.

We will lead with diplomacy because it's the smart approach. But we also know that military force will sometimes be necessary, and we will rely on it to protect our people and our interests when and where needed, as a last resort.

All the while, we must remember that to promote our interests around the world, America must be an exemplar of our values. Senator Isakson made the point to me the other day that our nation must lead by example rather than edict. Our history has shown that we are most effective when we see the harmony between our interests abroad and our values at home. And I take great comfort in knowing that our first secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson, also subscribed to that view, reminding us across the centuries: "The interests of a nation, when well-understood, will be found to coincide with their moral duties."

So while our democracy continues to inspire people around the world, we know that its influence is greatest when we live up to its teachings ourselves. Senator Lugar, I'm going to borrow your words here, because you have made this point so eloquently: You once said that "the United States cannot feed every person, lift every person out of poverty, cure every disease, or stop every conflict. But our power and status have conferred upon us a tremendous responsibility to humanity."

Of course, we must be realistic about achieving our goals. Even under the best of circumstances, our nation cannot solve every problem or meet every global need. We don't have unlimited time, treasure, or manpower. And we certainly don't face the best of circumstances today, with our economy faltering and our budget deficits growing.

So to fulfill our responsibility to our children, to protect and defend our nation while honoring our values, we have to establish priorities. Now, I'm not trying to mince words here. As my colleagues in the Senate know, "establishing priorities" means making tough choices. Because those choices are so important to the American people, we must be disciplined in evaluating them — weighing the costs and consequences of our action or inaction; gauging the probability of success; and insisting on measurable results.

Right after I was nominated a friend told me: "The world has so many problems. You've got your work cut out for you." Well, I agree that the problems are many and they are big. But I don't get up every morning thinking only about the threats and dangers we face. With every challenge comes an opportunity to find promise and possibility in the face of adversity and complexity. Today's world calls forth the optimism and can-do spirit that has marked our progress for more than two centuries.

Too often we see the ills that plague us more clearly than the possibilities in front of us. We see threats that must be thwarted; wrongs that must be righted; conflicts that must be calmed. But not the partnerships that can be promoted; the rights that can be reinforced; the innovations that can be fostered; the people who can be empowered.

After all, it is the real possibility of progress — of that better life, free from fear and want and discord — that offers our most compelling message to the rest of the world.

I've had the chance to lay out and submit my views on a broad array of issues in written responses to questions from the committee, so in this statement I will

outline some of the major challenges we face and some of the major opportunities we see.

First, President-elect Obama is committed to responsibly ending the war in Iraq and employing a broad strategy in Afghanistan that reduces threats to our safety and enhances the prospect of stability and peace.

Right now, our men and women in uniform, our diplomats, and our aid workers are risking their lives in those two countries. They have done everything we have asked of them and more. But, over time we have seen that our larger interests will be best served by safely and responsibly withdrawing our troops from Iraq, supporting a transition to full Iraqi responsibility for their sovereign nation, rebuilding our overtaxed military, and reaching out to other nations to help stabilize the region and to employ a broader arsenal of tools to fight terrorism.

Equally important will be a comprehensive plan using all elements of our power — diplomacy, development, and defense — to work with those in Afghanistan and Pakistan who want to root out al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other violent extremists who threaten them as well as us in what President-elect Obama has called the central front in the fight against terrorism. We need to deepen our engagement with these and other countries in the region and pursue policies that improve the lives of the Afghan and Pakistani people.

As we focus on Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, we must also actively pursue a strategy of smart power in the Middle East that addresses the security needs of Israel and the legitimate political and economic aspirations of the Palestinians; that effectively challenges Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and sponsorship of terror, and persuades both Iran and Syria to abandon their dangerous behavior and become constructive regional actors; that strengthens our relationships with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, other Arab states, with Turkey, and with our partners in the Gulf to involve them in securing a lasting peace in the region.

As intractable as the Middle East's problems may seem — and many presidents, including my husband, have spent years trying to help work out a resolution — we cannot give up on peace. The president-elect and I understand and are deeply sympathetic to Israel's desire to defend itself under the current conditions, and to be free of shelling by Hamas rockets.

However, we have also been reminded of the tragic humanitarian costs of conflict in the Middle East, and pained by the suffering of Palestinian and Israeli civilians. This must only increase our determination to seek a just and lasting peace agreement that brings real security to Israel; normal and positive relations

with its neighbors; and independence, economic progress, and security to the Palestinians in their own state.

We will exert every effort to support the work of Israelis and Palestinians who seek that result. It is critical not only to the parties involved but to our profound interests in undermining the forces of alienation and violent extremism across our world.

Terrorism remains a serious threat, and we must have a comprehensive strategy, leveraging intelligence, diplomacy, and military assets to defeat al-Qaida and like-minded terrorists by rooting out their networks and drying up support for their violent and nihilistic extremism. The gravest threat that America faces is the danger that weapons of mass destruction will fall into the hands of terrorists. To ensure our future security, we must curb the biological, chemical, or cyber — while we take the lead in working with others to reduce current nuclear stockpiles and prevent the development and use of dangerous new weaponry.

Therefore, while defending against the threat of terrorism, we will also seize the parallel opportunity to get America back in the business of engaging other nations to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons. We will work with Russia to secure their agreement to extend essential monitoring and verification provisions of the START treaty before it expires in December 2009, and we will work toward agreements for further reductions in nuclear weapons. We will also work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian missiles off hair-trigger alert, act with urgency to prevent proliferation in North Korea and Iran, secure loose nuclear weapons and materials, and shut down the market for selling them — as Senator Lugar has done for so many years. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, and the United States must exercise the leadership needed to shore up the regime. So, we will work with this committee and the Senate toward ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and reviving negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Today's security threats cannot be addressed in isolation. Smart power requires reaching out to both friends and adversaries, to bolster old alliances and to forge new ones.

That means strengthening the alliances that have stood the test of time — especially with our NATO partners and our allies in Asia. Our alliance with Japan is a cornerstone of American policy in Asia, essential to maintaining peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, and based on shared values and mutual interests. We also have crucial economic and security partnerships with South Korea, Australia, and other friends in ASEAN. We will build on our economic and

political partnership with India, the world's most populous democracy and a nation with growing influence in the world.

Our traditional relationships of confidence and trust with Europe will be deepened. Disagreements are inevitable, even among the closest friends, but on most global issues we have no more trusted allies. The new administration will have a chance to reach out across the Atlantic to leaders in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and others across the continent, including the new democracies. When America and Europe work together, global objectives are well within our means.

President-elect Obama and I seek a future of cooperative engagement with the Russian government on matters of strategic importance, while standing up strongly for American values and international norms. China is a critically important actor in a changing global landscape. We want a positive and cooperative relationship with China, one where we deepen and strengthen our ties on a number of issues, and candidly address differences where they persist.

But this is a not one-way effort — much of what we will do depends on the choices China makes about its future at home and abroad. With both Russia and China, we should work together on vital security and economic issues like terrorism, proliferation, climate change and reforming financial markets.

The world is now in the crosscurrents of the most severe global economic contraction since the Great Depression. The history of that crisis teaches us the consequences of diplomatic failures and uncoordinated reactions. Yet history alone is an insufficient guide; the world has changed too much. We have already seen that this crisis extends beyond the housing and banking sectors, and our solutions will have to be as wide in scope as the causes themselves, taking into account the complexities of the global economy, the geopolitics involved, and the likelihood of continued political and economic repercussions from the damage already done.

But here again, as we work to repair the damage, we can find new ways of working together. For too long, we have merely talked about the need to engage emerging powers in global economic governance; the time to take action is upon us. The recent G-20 meeting was a first step, but developing patterns of sustained engagement will take hard work and careful negotiation. We know that emerging markets like China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia are feeling the effects of the current crisis. We all stand to benefit in both the short and long term if they are part of the solution and become partners in maintaining global economic stability.

In our efforts to return to economic growth here in the United States, we have an especially critical need to work more closely with Canada, our largest trading partner, and Mexico, our third largest. Canada and Mexico are also our biggest suppliers of imported energy. More broadly, we must build a deeper partnership with Mexico to address the shared danger arising from drug trafficking and the challenges of our border, an effort begun this week with a meeting between President-elect Obama and President Calderon.

Throughout our hemisphere we have opportunities to enhance cooperation to meet common economic, security and environmental objectives that affect us all. We will return to a policy of vigorous engagement throughout Latin America, seeking deeper understanding and broader engagement with nations from the Caribbean to Central to South America. Not only do we share common political, economic and strategic interests with our friends to the south; our relationship is also enhanced by many shared ancestral and cultural legacies. We are looking forward to working on many issues during the Summit of the Americas in April and taking up the president-elect's call for a new energy partnership of the Americas built around shared technology and new investments in renewable energy.

In Africa, the foreign policy objectives of the Obama administration are rooted in security, political, economic, and humanitarian interests, including combating al-Qaida's efforts to seek safe havens in failed states in the Horn of Africa; helping African nations to conserve their natural resources and reap fair benefits from them; stopping war in Congo; ending autocracy in Zimbabwe and human devastation in Darfur; supporting African democracies like South Africa and Ghana — which just had its second change of power in democratic elections; and working aggressively to reach the Millennium Development Goals in health, education, and economic opportunity.

Many significant problems we face challenge not just the United States, but all nations and peoples. You, Mr. Chairman, were among the first, in a growing chorus from both parties, to recognize that climate change is an unambiguous security threat. At the extreme it threatens our very existence, but well before that point, it could very well incite new wars of an old kind — over basic resources like food, water, and arable land. The world is in need of an urgent, coordinated response to climate change and, as President-elect Obama has said, America must be a leader in developing and implementing it. We can lead abroad through participation in international efforts like the upcoming U.N. Copenhagen Climate Conference and a Global Energy Forum. We can lead at home by pursuing an energy policy that reduces our carbon emissions while reducing our dependence on foreign oil and gas — which will benefit the fight against climate change and enhance our economy and security.

The great statesman and general George Marshall noted that our gravest enemies are often not nations or doctrines, but "hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." To create more friends and fewer enemies, we can't just win wars. We must find common ground and common purpose with other peoples and nations so that together we can overcome hatred, violence, lawlessness, and despair.

The Obama administration recognizes that, even when we cannot fully agree with some governments, we share a bond of humanity with their people. By investing in that common humanity we advance our common security because we pave the way for a more peaceful, prosperous world.

Mr. Chairman, you were one of the first to underscore the importance of our involvement in the global AIDS fight. And you have worked very hard on this issue for many years. Now, thanks to a variety of efforts — including President Bush's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief as well as the work of NGOs and foundations — the United States enjoys widespread support in public opinion polls in many African countries. This is true even among Muslim populations in Tanzania and Kenya, where America is seen as a leader in the fight against AIDS, malaria, and TB.

We have an opportunity to build on this success by partnering with NGOs to help expand the infrastructure of health clinics in Africa so that more people can have access to lifesaving drugs, fewer mothers transmit HIV to their children, and fewer lives are lost.

And we can generate even more goodwill through other kinds of social investment, by working effectively with international organizations and NGO partners to build schools and train teachers, and by ensuring that children are free from hunger and exploitation so that they can attend those schools and pursue their dreams for the future. This is why the president-elect supports a Global Education Fund to bolster secular education around the world.

I want to take a moment to emphasize the importance of a "bottom up" approach to ensuring that America remains a positive force in the world. The president-elect and I believe in this strongly. Investing in our common humanity through social development is not marginal to our foreign policy but integral to accomplishing our goals.

Today more than 2 billion people worldwide live on less than \$2 a day. They are facing rising food prices and widespread hunger. Calls for expanding civil and political rights in countries plagued by mass hunger and disease will fall on deaf ears unless democracy actually delivers material benefits that improve people's

lives while weeding out the corruption that too often stands in the way of progress.

Our foreign policy must reflect our deep commitment to the cause of making human rights a reality for millions of oppressed people around the world. Of particular concern to me is the plight of women and girls, who comprise the majority of the world's unhealthy, unschooled, unfed, and unpaid. If half of the world's population remains vulnerable to economic, political, legal, and social marginalization, our hope of advancing democracy and prosperity will remain in serious jeopardy. We still have a long way to go, and the United States must remain an unambiguous and unequivocal voice in support of women's rights in every country, every region, on every continent.

As a personal aside, I want to mention that President-elect Obama's mother, Ann Dunham, was a pioneer in microfinance in Indonesia. In my own work on microfinance around the world — from Bangladesh to Chile to Vietnam to South Africa and many other countries — I've seen firsthand how small loans given to poor women to start small businesses can raise standards of living and transform local economies. President-elect Obama's mother had planned to attend a microfinance forum at the Beijing women's conference in 1995 that I participated in. Unfortunately, she was very ill and couldn't travel and, sadly, passed away a few months later. But I think it's fair to say that her work in international development, the care and concern she showed for women and for poor people around the world, mattered greatly to her son, and certainly has informed his views and his vision. We will be honored to carry on Ann Dunham's work in the months and years ahead.

I've discussed a few of our top priorities and I know we'll address many more in the question-and-answer session. But I suspect that even this brief overview offers a glimpse of the daunting, and crucial, challenges we face, as well as the opportunities before us. President-elect Obama and I pledge to work closely with this committee and the Congress to forge a bipartisan, integrated, results-oriented sustainable foreign policy that will restore American leadership to confront these challenges, serve our interests, and advance our values.

Ensuring that our State Department is functioning at its best will be absolutely essential to America's success. This is a top priority of mine, of my colleagues' on the national security team, and of the president-elect's. He believes strongly that we need to invest in our civilian capacity to conduct vigorous American diplomacy, provide the kind of foreign assistance I've mentioned, reach out to the world, and operate effectively alongside our military.

I realize that the entire State Department bureaucracy in Thomas Jefferson's day consisted of a chief clerk, three regular clerks and a messenger — and his entire budget was \$56,000 a year. But over the past 219 years the world, and the times, have certainly changed. Now the department consists of Foreign Service officers, the civil service, and locally engaged staff working at Foggy Bottom, in offices across our country, and at some 260 posts around the world. And today, USAID carries out a critical development mission that is essential to representing our values across the globe.

These public servants are too often unsung heroes. They are in the trenches putting our policies and values to work in an increasingly complicated and dangerous world. Many risk their lives, and some lose their lives, in service to our nation. And they need and deserve the resources, training, and support to succeed.

I know this committee, and I hope the American public, understand that right now foreign service officers, civil service professionals, and development experts are doing work essential to our nation's strength — whether helping American businesses make inroads in new markets; being on the other end of the phone at a United States embassy when an American citizen needs help beyond our shores; doing the delicate work of diplomacy and development with foreign governments that leads to arms control and trade agreements, peace treaties and post-conflict reconstruction, greater human rights and empowerment, broader cultural understanding and stronger alliances.

The State Department is a large, multidimensional organization. But it is not a placid or idle bureaucracy, as some would like to paint it. It is an outpost for American values that protects our citizens and safeguards our democratic institutions in times both turbulent and tame. State Department employees also offer a lifeline of hope and help — often the only lifeline — for people in foreign lands who are oppressed, silenced, and marginalized.

Whether they are an economic officer in a large embassy, or an aid worker in the field, or a clerk in a distant consulate or a country officer working late in Washington, they do their work so that we may all live in peace and security. We must not shortchange them, or ourselves, by denying them the resources they need.

One of my first priorities is to make sure that the State Department and USAID have the resources they need, and I will be back to make the case to Congress for full funding of the president's budget request. At the same time, I will work just as hard to make sure that we manage those resources prudently so that we fulfill our mission efficiently and effectively.

In concluding, I hope you will indulge me one final observation. Like most Americans, I never had the chance to travel widely outside our country as a child or young adult. Most of my early professional career was as a lawyer and advocate for children who found themselves on society's margins here at home. But during the eight years of my husband's presidency, and then in my eight years as a senator, I have been privileged to travel on behalf of the United States to more than 80 countries.

I've had the opportunity to get to know many world leaders. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee I've spent time with our military commanders, as well as our brave troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I have immersed myself in an array of military issues. I've spent many hours with American and non-American aid workers, businessmen and women, religious leaders, teachers, doctors, nurses, students, volunteers and others who have made it their mission to help people across the world. I have also learned invaluable lessons from countless ordinary citizens in foreign capitals, small towns, and rural villages whose lives offered a glimpse into a world far removed from what many of us experience on a daily basis here in America.

In recent years, as other nations have risen to compete for military, economic, and political influence, some have argued that we have reached the end of the "American moment" in world history. I disagree. Yes, the conventional paradigms have shifted. But America's success has never been solely a function of our power; it has always been inspired by our values.

With so many troubles here at home and across the world, millions of people are still trying to come to our country — legally and illegally. Why? Because we are guided by unchanging truths: that all people are created equal; that each person has a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And in these truths we will find, as we have for more than two centuries, the courage, the discipline, and the creativity to meet the challenges of this ever-changing world.

I am humbled to be a public servant, and honored by the responsibility placed on me by our president-elect, who embodies the American dream not only here at home but far beyond our shores.

No matter how daunting our challenges may be, I have a steadfast faith in our country and our people, and I am proud to be an American at the dawning of this new American moment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for granting me your time and attention today. I know there is a lot more territory to cover and I'd be delighted to answer your questions.

APPENDIX E

TITLE XIV of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 09

Also known as the Reconstruction and Stabilization Management Act of 2008

TITLE XVI—RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT

Sec. 1601. Short title.

Sec. 1602. Findings.

Sec. 1603. Definitions.

Sec. 1604. Authority to provide assistance for reconstruction and stabilization crises.

Sec. 1605. Reconstruction and stabilization.

Sec. 1606. Authorities related to personnel.

Sec. 1607. Reconstruction and stabilization strategy.

Sec. 1608. Annual reports to Congress.

SEC. 1601. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the “Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008”.

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SEC. 1602. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) In June 2004, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (referred to as the “Coordinator”)

was established in the Department of State with the

mandate to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize United States Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for postconflict

situations and help reconstruct and stabilize a country

or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife.

(2) In December 2005, the Coordinator’s mandate was reaffirmed

by the National Security Presidential Directive 44,

which instructed the Secretary of State, and at the Secretary’s direction, the Coordinator, to coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all United States departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations.

(3) National Security Presidential Directive 44 assigns to the Secretary, with the Coordinator’s assistance, the lead role to develop reconstruction and stabilization strategies, ensure civilian interagency program and policy coordination, coordinate interagency processes to identify countries at risk of instability, provide decision-makers with detailed options for an integrated

United States Government response in connection with reconstruction and stabilization operations, and carry out a wide range of other actions, including the development of a civilian surge capacity to meet reconstruction and stabilization emergencies. The Secretary and the Coordinator are also charged with coordinating with the Department of Defense on reconstruction and stabilization responses, and integrating planning and implementing procedures.

(4) The Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05, which establishes that stability operations are a core United States military mission that the Department of Defense must be prepared to conduct and support, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time, and assigns responsibilities

within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

(5) The President's Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request to Congress includes \$248.6 million for a Civilian Stabilization Initiative that would vastly improve civilian partnership with United States Armed Forces in post-conflict stabilization situations, including by establishing a Active Response Corps of 250 persons, a Standby Response Corps of 2,000 persons, and a Civilian Response Corps of 2,000 persons.

SEC. 1603. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) **ADMINISTRATOR.**—The term “Administrator” means the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development.

(2) **AGENCY.**—The term “agency” means any entity included in chapter 1 of title 5, United States Code.

(3) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee S. 3001—299

on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(4) **DEPARTMENT.**—Except as otherwise provided in this title, the term “Department” means the Department of State.

(5) **PERSONNEL.**—The term “personnel” means individuals serving in any service described in section 2101 of title 5, United States Code, other than in the legislative or judicial branch.

(6) **SECRETARY.**—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of State.

SEC. 1604. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION CRISES.

Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2351 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 617 the following new section:

“SEC. 618. ASSISTANCE FOR A RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION CRISIS.

“(a) ASSISTANCE.—

“(1) **IN GENERAL.**—If the President determines that it is in the national security interests of the United States for United States civilian agencies or non-Federal employees to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing a country or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife, the President may, in accordance with the provisions set forth in section 614(a)(3), but notwithstanding any other provision of law, and on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, furnish assistance to such country or region for reconstruction or stabilization using funds described in paragraph (2).

“(2) **FUNDS DESCRIBED.**—The funds referred to in paragraph (1) are funds made available under any other provision of this Act, and transferred or reprogrammed for purposes of this section, and such transfer or reprogramming shall be subject to the procedures applicable to a notification under section 634A of this Act.

“(3) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to provide authority to transfer funds between accounts or between Federal departments or agencies.

“(b) LIMITATION.—The authority contained in this section may be exercised only during fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011.”.

SEC. 1605. RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION.

Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 62. RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION.

“(a) OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION.—

“(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established within the Department of State the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

“(2) COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION.—

The head of the Office shall be the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, who shall be appointed by

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the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Coordinator shall report directly to the Secretary.

“(3) FUNCTIONS.—The functions of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization shall include the following:

“(A) Monitoring, in coordination with relevant bureaus and offices of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for the reconstruction and stabilization of a country or region that is at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife.

“(B) Assessing the various types of reconstruction and stabilization crises that could occur and cataloging and monitoring the non-military resources and capabilities of agencies (as such term is defined in section 1603 of the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008) that are available to address such crises.

“(C) Planning, in conjunction with USAID, to address requirements, such as demobilization, disarmament, rebuilding of civil society, policing, human rights monitoring, and public information, that commonly arise in reconstruction and stabilization crises.

“(D) Coordinating with relevant agencies to develop interagency contingency plans and procedures to mobilize and deploy civilian personnel and conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations to address the various types of such crises.

“(E) Entering into appropriate arrangements with agencies to carry out activities under this section and the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008.

“(F) Identifying personnel in State and local governments and in the private sector who are available to participate in the Civilian Reserve Corps established under subsection (b) or to otherwise participate in or contribute to reconstruction and stabilization activities.

“(G) Taking steps to ensure that training and education of civilian personnel to perform such reconstruction and

stabilization activities is adequate and is carried out, as appropriate, with other agencies involved with stabilization operations.

“(H) Taking steps to ensure that plans for United States reconstruction and stabilization operations are coordinated with and complementary to reconstruction and stabilization activities of other governments and international and nongovernmental organizations, to improve effectiveness and avoid duplication.

“(I) Maintaining the capacity to field on short notice an evaluation team consisting of personnel from all relevant agencies to undertake on-site needs assessment.

“(b) RESPONSE READINESS CORPS.—

“(1) RESPONSE READINESS CORPS.—The Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the heads of other appropriate agencies of the United States Government, may establish

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and maintain a Response Readiness Corps (referred to in this section as the ‘Corps’) to provide assistance in support of reconstruction and stabilization operations in countries or regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife. The Corps shall be composed of active and standby components consisting of United States Government personnel, including employees of the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and other agencies who are recruited and trained (and employed in the case of the active component) to provide such assistance when deployed to do so by the Secretary to support the purposes of this Act.

“(2) CIVILIAN RESERVE CORPS.—The Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, may establish a Civilian Reserve Corps for which purpose the Secretary is authorized to employ and train individuals who have the skills necessary for carrying out reconstruction and stabilization activities, and who have volunteered for that purpose. The Secretary may deploy members of the Civilian Reserve Corps pursuant to a determination by the President under section 618 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

“(3) MITIGATION OF DOMESTIC IMPACT.—The establishment and deployment of any Civilian Reserve Corps shall be undertaken in a manner that will avoid substantively impairing the capacity and readiness of any State and local governments from which Civilian Reserve Corps personnel may be drawn.

“(c) EXISTING TRAINING AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS.—The Secretary shall ensure that personnel of the Department, and, in coordination with the Administrator of USAID, that personnel of USAID, make use of the relevant existing training and education programs offered within the Government, such as those at the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and the Interagency Training, Education, and After Action Review Program at the National Defense University.”.

SEC. 1606. AUTHORITIES RELATED TO PERSONNEL.

(a) EXTENSION OF CERTAIN FOREIGN SERVICE BENEFITS.—The Secretary, or the head of any agency with respect to personnel

of that agency, may extend to any individuals assigned, detailed, or deployed to carry out reconstruction and stabilization activities pursuant to section 62 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (as added by section 1605 of this title), the benefits or privileges set forth in sections 413, 704, and 901 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3973, 22 U.S.C. 4024, and 22 U.S.C. 4081) to the same extent and manner that such benefits and privileges are extended to members of the Foreign Service.

(b) AUTHORITY REGARDING DETAILS.—The Secretary is authorized to accept details or assignments of any personnel, and any employee of a State or local government, on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis for the purpose of carrying out this title, and the head of any agency is authorized to detail or assign personnel of such agency on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to the Department of State for purposes of section 62 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as added by section 1605 of this title.

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SEC. 1607. RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION STRATEGY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall develop an interagency strategy to respond to reconstruction and stabilization operations.

(b) CONTENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following:

- (1) Identification of and efforts to improve the skills sets needed to respond to and support reconstruction and stabilization operations in countries or regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife.
- (2) Identification of specific agencies that can adequately satisfy the skills sets referred to in paragraph (1).
- (3) Efforts to increase training of Federal civilian personnel to carry out reconstruction and stabilization activities.
- (4) Efforts to develop a database of proven and best practices based on previous reconstruction and stabilization operations.
- (5) A plan to coordinate the activities of agencies involved in reconstruction and stabilization operations.

SEC. 1608. ANNUAL REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually for each of the five years thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of this title. The report shall include detailed information on the following:

- (1) Any steps taken to establish a Response Readiness Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps, pursuant to section 62 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (as added by section 1605 of this title).
- (2) The structure, operations, and cost of the Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Reserve Corps, if established.
- (3) How the Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Reserve Corps coordinate, interact, and work with other United States foreign assistance programs.
- (4) An assessment of the impact that deployment of the Civilian Reserve Corps, if any, has had on the capacity and readiness of any domestic agencies or State and local governments from which Civilian Reserve Corps personnel are drawn.

- (5) The reconstruction and stabilization strategy required by section 1607 and any annual updates to that strategy.
- (6) Recommendations to improve implementation of subsection (b) of section 62 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, including measures to enhance the recruitment and retention of an effective Civilian Reserve Corps.
- (7) A description of anticipated costs associated with the development, annual sustainment, and deployment of the Civilian Reserve Corps.

GLOSSARY

ARC	Active Response Corps
CORDS	Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Support
CRC	Civilian Response Corps
DoD	Department of Defense
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
GS	General Schedule
NSC	National Security Council
POLAD	Political Advisors
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994

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